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Abstract 
This thesis examined cost growth in Department of Defense (DoD) missile 
systems from 1991 to 2001 using Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) data with a hybrid 
adjusted cost growth (ACG) model.  In addition, an analysis of acquisition reform 
initiatives during the treatment period was conducted to determine if reform efforts 
impacted missile system cost growth.  A “pre-reform” (1 January 1991 to 31 December 
1996) period and “post reform” (1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001) period was 
subjectively developed to compare the mean annual ACG during each period for 
statistical differences.  The hybrid ACG model outlined in this thesis may aid program 
managers and other interested parties in determining weapon systems cost growth, and 
the conclusion drawn from analyzing current acquisition initiatives may aid DoD 
leadership in assessing reform effectiveness on reducing cost growth. 
This research effort analyzed 135 SARs for 21 missile systems that reported a 
Milestone II baseline during the treatment period.  ACG calculations revealed that missile 
systems from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2001 averaged 28 percent cost growth 
annually.  The acquisition reform analysis included 76 SARs from 20 programs during 
the pre-reform period and 59 SARs from 13 programs in the post-reform period.  A small 
sample t-test and a significance level of 0.05 were used to compare the annual means of 
the two periods.  The analysis revealed that the annual average ACG of the post reform 
period is significantly higher than the annual average ACG of the pre-reform period.  The 
thesis methodology, results, and suggestions for future research are provided. 
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AN ANALYSIS OF MISSILE SYSTEMS COST GROWTH AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES USING A 
HYBRID ADJUSTED COST GROWTH MODEL 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
General Issue 
Cost growth in major weapon system programs, defined as the difference between 
estimated and actual costs, has been an enduring problem in the Department of Defense 
(DoD) for the past four decades.  According to a 1993 RAND study, cost growth has 
hovered around 20 percent since the mid 1960s (Drezner et al., 1993:xiii).  Table 1 
identifies the average cost growth factors between services as of 31 December 1990 and 
Table 2 provides the average cost growth factors by system type as of 31 December 1990. 
Table 1.  Cost Growth Differences Between Services (Drezner, 1993:26) 
Service   
Cost 
Growth 
Factor 
Number of 
Observations 
Average Program 
Cost (billions 
FY90$) 
Average Age (years 
past EMD) 
Total DE 1.20 120 5.50 9.40 
     
Air Force 1.20 41 6.70 8.70 
Army 1.35 28 2.70 10.30 
Navy 1.16 51 6.10 9.50 
     NOTE:  DE baseline, weighted average, mature programs. 
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Table 2.  Cost Growth by System Type (Drezner, 1993:28) 
Weapon 
Type   
Cost 
Growth 
Factor 
Number of 
Observations 
Average Program 
Cost (billions 
Fy90$) 
Average Age (years 
past EMD) 
Aircraft 1.28 14 13.80 10.50 
Helicopter 1.13 5 8.10 13.00 
Missile 1.17 44 5.10 9.50 
Electronic 1.24 27 2.20 8.50 
Munition 1.22 7 1.70 7.70 
Vehicle 1.71 3 3.00 12.00 
Space 1.16 3 2.00 12.00 
Ship 1.10 14 7.50 9.10 
Other 0.99 3 3.00 5.70 
     NOTE:  DE baseline, weighted average, mature programs. 
 
Risk and uncertainty, inherent drivers in weapon systems development cost 
growth, pose a significant challenge to the cost estimator.  In an attempt to minimize risk 
and uncertainty, streamline the procurement process, and decrease cost growth, the DoD 
has implemented numerous acquisition reform initiatives over the past 40 years.  Most 
recently, the October 30, 2002 memorandum from Undersecretary of Defense Wolfowitz 
canceled the DoD 5000 Defense Acquisition Policy Documents stating, “I have 
determined that the current subject documents require revision to create an acquisition 
policy environment that fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity, and innovation” 
(Wolfowitz, 2002).  Cancellation of the DoD 5000 series marks the latest attempt by the 
DoD to minimize weapon system cost growth and minimize negative public opinion 
about procurement cost overruns. 
Specific Issue  
Historically, cost estimation has posed a tremendous challenge to estimators and 
program managers in defense weapons system procurement.  Unrealistic or imprecise 
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weapon system cost estimates negatively impact the quality of decisions concerning U.S. 
defense policy; distorting the rationale for resource allocation decisions.  An occasional 
unrealistic estimate would not pose a significant problem.  However, even despite 
acquisition reform initiatives implemented in the 1970s and 1980s to reduce costs, 
research has shown that weapon system programs during this period continued to 
experience cost and schedule overruns regularly (Searle, 1997:38).  In the 1990s and 
early 2000s, additional reform initiatives were enacted by the Clinton and Bush 
administrations to curb this trend.  Figure 1 displays the timeline of current acquisition 
reform initiatives.  While the last three DoD acquisition chiefs have deemed the current 
acquisition reform movement successful (Holbrook, 2003:2-3), a weapon system cost 
growth statistical analysis is needed to obtain an objective measure of the successfulness 
during this period. 
 
Figure 1.  Current Acquisition Reform Initiatives (1991-2003) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
NPR FASA Clinger-Cohen DoDD 5000 Rewrites 
 4
Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This study focuses on measuring total missile systems cost growth from DoD 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) by applying a hybrid adjusted cost growth model, 
along with analyzing the impact of recent acquisition reform initiatives on cost growth 
over time.  While past research has analyzed combined program cost growth over all 
weapons systems programs, this study attempts to identify cost growth from a more 
micro-level analysis.  The SAR is one of the few official management reporting systems 
that provides consistent and reasonably reliable data on the status of DoD acquisition 
programs (Drezner et al., 1993:7).  These reports are developed annually at the program 
office level and are reviewed by the Performance Management Office in OUSD(A) 
before they are released in conjunction with the President’s budget.  SARs summarize the 
latest estimates of cost, schedule and technical status, while separating program cost 
variance into seven categories: Economic, Quantity, Estimating, Engineering, Schedule, 
Support, and Other (Drezner et al., 1993:7). 
     For the purpose of this research, the SAR provides an easily accessible, universally 
utilized database that offers sufficient data reliability; however, it is not without 
limitations.  According to the 1993 RAND report, the SAR may introduce unacceptable 
error in the cost growth calculation unless care is taken to fully understand how the data 
was generated (Drezner et al., 1993:9).  RAND identified the following problem areas 
with the SAR: 
 1.  High level of aggregation 
 2.  Changing baseline estimate and program restructuring 
 3.  Changing preparation guidelines and thresholds 
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 4.  Inconsistent allocation of cost variances 
 5.  Emphasis on effects, not causes 
 6.  Incomplete coverage of program causes 
 7.  Unknown and varied budget levels for program risk 
     Additionally, security classifications of sensitive programs may render some cost data 
unavailable for this research.  Chapter III will address the precautions taken to minimize 
the effects of these problem areas on cost growth calculations. 
Research Objectives 
This research has two main objectives.  First, the study quantifies the magnitude 
of missile system cost growth from 1991 to 2001 using a hybrid cost growth 
methodology.  Capturing the current cost growth trend identifies if acquisition programs 
have improved cost overruns or if they continue to accumulate approximately 20 percent 
cost growth.  The results of this research will provide insight into the budgetary status of 
missile systems and offer DoD officials a cost growth model that can be used to 
determine how well program management has done in estimating and controlling costs 
within its command.  The results of this research will provide insight into the budgetary 
status of missile systems and offer relevant program managers a tool to measure their 
own cost growth against similar programs. 
Second, the study determines the impact of acquisition reform initiatives on 
missile system cost growth from 1991 to 2001.  It is important to determine if continued 
acquisition reform efforts are actually accomplishing their objectives, since previous 
research has found no conclusive evidence that acquisition reform has reduced cost 
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growth.  This statement is further reinforced in the 1993 RAND study which states, “It 
seems reasonable to expect that the myriad of initiatives implemented over the last 
several decades intended to control costs and improve cost estimating capabilities would 
have had some positive effect.  Unfortunately, we can detect no such effect in the data” 
(Drezner et al., 1993:50).  If a reduction in cost growth is found, DoD leadership can use 
this analysis to estimate the amount of time reform initiatives require to impact cost 
growth.  However, If current reform initiatives fail to prove positive impact on cost 
growth, then the acquisition community and legislators may need to rethink the current 
situation and address the problem of cost growth from another angle. 
Summary 
This study quantifies the magnitude of weapon system cost growth by applying a 
hybrid adjusted cost growth model developed by RAND, while focusing specifically on 
the area of missile system programs.  Expanding on the cost growth determination, this 
research explores the impact of recent acquisition reform initiatives on current cost 
growth trends.  Identification of current cost growth levels and the impact of acquisition 
reform efforts will provide program managers and government officials insight into the 
effectiveness of the acquisition process and recent legislation.  
Organization of the Study 
This chapter established the motivation for analyzing the topic and the research 
objectives.  Chapter II describes past and present acquisition reform efforts and highlights 
recent cost growth studies.  Chapter III details the methodology used to analyze the 
quantitative cost data and Chapter IV identifies the results of the analysis.  Finally, 
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Chapter V provides conclusions from the study and recommendations for further 
research. 
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II.  Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a description of missile systems, examines both historical 
and current acquisition reform initiatives, and reviews recent cost growth studies.  
Missile Systems 
For the purpose of this research, a missile system is defined as any weapon 
system deemed as a missile system in the Department of Defense (DoD) Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group cost growth database.  Table 3 identifies the 21 specific missile 
systems reviewed in this study and provides each program’s technical nomenclature 
along with any common name in parentheses. 
Table 3.  Missile System Programs 
AGM-65D (Maverick) CBU-97B (SFW) 
AGM-84A (Harpoon) FGM-148A (Javeline AAWS) 
AGM-88 (HARM USN) JDAM 
AGM-114 (Hellfire) MIM-104 (Patriot) 
AGM-114K (Hellfire Longbow) MIM-104 (Patriot PAC3) 
AIM-9X (Sidewinder) Navy Area TBMD 
AIM-54C (Phoenix) RIM-66M/67D (SM-2 MR/ER) 
AIM-120 (AMRAAM) RGM-109 (Tomahawk MMM) 
ATACMS P3I (BAT) SADARM 155mm Projectile 
BLU-108 (JSOW AIWS) SADARM 155mm Rocket 
BLU-108 (JSOW Unitary)   
 
While the Army and Navy comprise about two-thirds of all missile systems, the 
Air Force and DoD as a whole also maintain ownership of specific missile systems 
analyzed in this study. 
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Acquisition Reform 
The historical overview starts with Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert 
McNamara’s changes in 1960 and concludes with the 1989 Defense Management Report.  
The current reform overview begins with the National Performance Review (NPR) and 
ends with a summary of recent DoD 5000 series rewrites.  During the period in review, 
acquisition reform has evolved with each administration’s reports and recommendations.  
The most recent acquisition reform framework is as follows: 
Acquisition reform, a theory pervasive throughout the Department of Defense, is  
an endeavor to make the acquisition process more effective, efficient, and  
productive. It involves reducing overhead, streamlining requirements, speeding up  
processes, cutting paperwork and other similar initiatives to reduce bureaucracy.  
Acquisition reform includes a move toward the use of commercial practices as  
well as the use of private enterprise to do more of the functions traditionally done  
by government. (What is Acquisition Reform, DSMC, 2001) 
Historical Acquisition Reform Overview (1960s to 1990) 
Studies by the Department of Defense (DoD) about acquisition reform have been 
conducted over the past 40 years, with each report outlining ways to simplify and 
improve the weapons procurement processes to make them more efficient and effective.  
Table 4 lists some of the defense acquisition reports and studies conducted from the 
1960s through the 1980s.  This historical reform summary will focus on those 
highlighted, as these are the most meaningful and significant efforts to shape the 
acquisition process. 
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Table 4.  Significant Defense Acquisition Studies (Jones, 1996:405) 
Report by Initiated by Issued
*McNamara Initiatives SECDEF 1961
Peck & Scherer (Harvard Business School) Authors 1962, 1964
*Packard Initiatives Deputy SECDEF 1969-1970
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission) President 1970
Commission on Government Procurement Congress 1972
J. Ronald Fox (Harvard Business School) Author 1974
Military Services and Secretary of Defense DoD 1974-75
Defense Science Board Summer Study DoD 1977
     (Acquisition Cycle Task Force)
Defense Resources Board DoD 1979
DoD Resource Management Study President 1979
Jacques S. Gansler Author 1980
Acquisition Improvement Task Force DoD 1981
     (Carlucci Initiatives)
Special Panel on Defense Procurement Procedures House Armed Services Committee 1982
Grace Commission President 1983
Special Task Force on Selected Defense Senate Armed Services Committee 1984
     Procurement Matters
Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies Center 1985
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management President 1986
     (Packard Commission)
Defense Management Review DoD 1989
*Added by the authors
 
McNamara Initiatives 
Acquisition reform efforts began in the 1960s in an attempt to fix the procurement 
system when “Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert S. McNamara (1961 to 1968) 
instituted many of the first substantial acquisition reforms through his centralized 
decision-making apparatus and the new Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System” 
(Jones, 1999:402).  The system was a systematic process for establishing requirements 
and incorporating them into a five-year budget.  In addition, he formed the Defense 
Supply Agency, Defense Contract Administration Service, and Defense Contract Audit 
Agency; all organizations designed to improve the government acquisition process.  
McNamara also initiated industry practices used at Ford Motor Company in his days as 
an executive there by “establishing requirements for analytical rigor in evaluating the 
need, costs, and operational effectiveness of new weapons systems” (Reeves, 1996:16).  
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His blueprint for evaluating weapon system programs through concept exploration, 
research and development, and production phases laid the framework for the life cycle 
process used in program offices today.  Despite these significant attempts to improve the 
weapon systems procurement process, DoD “continued to reward cost increases and to 
penalize cost reductions” (Fox and Field, 1988:42), prompting future Defense Secretaries 
and Congress to attempt additional reforms. 
Packard Initiatives 
The military spending draw down in the late 1960’s enunciated by the unpopular 
Vietnam War and rising cost of defense acquisition, prompted David Packard, then 
Deputy Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) under the Nixon Administration, to recognize 
that the government needed a better way to manage the procurement of weapons systems 
and reduce cost growth (Ferrara, 1996:110).  In 1996, Deputy Secretary Packard 
“returned to the Services much authority for conducting the acquisition process” (Jones, 
1999:402).  He believed it was essential for the individual services to have autonomy 
over their programs, while OSD maintained some program oversight (Fox and Field, 
1988:44).  To ensure careful evaluation and informed decisions were made before a 
program proceeded to the next phase, Secretary Packard developed the Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) “to advise him of the status of each major defense 
system” (Fox & Field, 1988:44).  The group was also responsible for reviewing the 
management practices of major programs to determine if reform was needed. 
In May 1970, Packard released a memorandum mentioning further changes to 
streamline the acquisition process and reduce cost growth (Fox and Field, 1988:44).  
Many of the initiatives in Packard’s memorandum such as decentralized program 
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execution, streamlined management structures, and use of appropriate contract 
mechanisms, laid the foundation for the first DoD Directive 5000.1, “Acquisition of 
Major Defense Systems” (Ferrara, 1996:111).  Secretary Packard’s vision as outlined in 
the Directive is as follows: 
 Successful development, production, and deployment of major defense systems 
are primarily dependent upon competent people, rational priorities, and clearly 
defined responsibilities.  Responsibility and authority for the acquisition of major 
defense systems shall be decentralized to the maximum practicable extent 
consistent with the urgency and importance of each program. 
 
 The development and production of a major defense system shall be managed by 
a single individual (program manager) who shall have a charter that provides 
sufficient authority to accomplish recognized program objectives.  Layers of 
authority between program manager and his Component Head shall be 
minimum…[the] assignment and tenure of program managers shall be a matter of 
concern to DoD Component Heads and shall reflect career incentives designed to 
attract, retain, and reward competent personnel. (Ferrara, 1996:111) 
 
The final section of DoDD 5000.1 contained the following guidance (Ferrara, 1996:112): 
• Wherever feasible, operational needs shall be satisfied through the use of 
existing military or commercial hardware; 
 
• Practical tradeoffs shall be made between system capability, cost, and 
schedule; 
 
• Logistic support shall be considered as a principal design parameter; 
 
• Schedules shall be structured to avoid unnecessary overlapping or 
concurrency; 
 
• Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible; 
 
• Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics, including 
risk; 
 
• Source selection decisions shall take into account the contractor’s capability; 
 
• Develop a necessary defense system on a timely and cost-effective basis; and 
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• Documentation shall be generated in the minimum amount to satisfy 
necessary and specific management needs. 
Under this directive, program managers were to “be given adequate authority to 
make major decisions, recognition and rewards for good work, and more opportunity for 
career advancement” (Fox and Field, 1988:45).  However promising this may have 
sounded, it produced few encouraging changes within the military services and 
established no accountability for weapons systems cost growth (Fox and Field, 1988: 45).  
Ironically, Secretary Packard’s visions laid forth in his memorandum over thirty years 
ago are still the underlining theme of current acquisition reform initiatives. 
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission) 
While many of the previous major Executive led reform studies focused on 
government procurement in general, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, enacted in July 
1969 by President Nixon because of strong public criticism of defense procurement, 
concentrated on weapons systems acquisition.  The Panel, dubbed the Fitzhugh 
Commission after its chairperson, Gilbert Fitzhugh, issued study reports that were “the 
first systematic evaluation of defense acquisition practices” (Reeves, 1996:16).  The 
commission was explicitly asked to comment on “defense procurement policies and 
practices, particularly as they relate to costs, time and quality” (Bair, 1994:11).  The 
Panel found that the department’s excessive centralization, the Secretary of Defense’s 
large span of control, and the many layers of management had “contributed to serious 
cost overruns, schedule slippages and performance deficiencies” (Fitzhugh report, 
1970:2).  Essentially, the commission’s recommendations were the undoing of many of 
the centralized business practices initiated by Robert McNamara ten years earlier. 
 14
In addition to the advice for decentralization, the Panel accentuated the need for 
increased prototype testing, flexibility in choosing an acquisition strategy, more 
professional development of acquisition personnel, and expanded authority for program 
managers.  The report further recommended “that fixed price contracts should not be used 
in research and development efforts” because of the “high risks and many technical and 
engineering unknowns associated with these efforts” (Reeves, 1996:17).  Unfortunately, 
this particular recommendation was not accepted by the DoD and resulted in the near 
bankruptcy in the late 1980s of several defense contractors accepting fixed price contracts 
for research and development efforts, including LTV Corporation and Northrop 
Grumman.  Ironically, not until after these incidents did the DoD finally decide against 
the use of fixed price contracts. 
Of the Panel’s recommendations, exclusive of the non use of fixed price contracts 
previously described, most were embraced by the DoD and “virtually mirrored” the 
initiatives established by David Packard (Bair, 1994:13).  Many have implied that the 
Panel’s reports, because of their initiation by the President and support from the 
Congress, affirm the recommendations earlier issued by Packard.  However, because the 
Panel’s recommendations were left to the DoD to implement and did not require 
Congressional action, few of the initiatives were actually implemented.  In fact, similar 
recommendations were again made in the 1985 Packard Commission report, raising the 
question of implementation effectiveness of the Panel’s initiatives. 
Commission on Government Procurement 
All previous efforts to reform the acquisition process and reduce cost growth were 
directed by either the Secretary of Defense or the President.  The Commission on 
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Government Procurement was the first such attempt by Congress and was designed as a 
comprehensive review of all government buying practices and procedures (Bair, 1994:13-
14).  The creation of the commission was prompted by growing concern that the federal 
procurement practices were ineffective because of a lack of uniformity and an increase in 
complexity.  The commission’s initial findings revealed: 
• Congress was ill-equipped to evaluate performance, costs, and schedule for 
new defense systems programs in the context of national security objectives 
and priorities. 
 
• Congress should establish an Office of Federal Procurement Policy headed by 
a presidential appointee to oversee procurement policies and systems. 
 
• Congress should consolidate all statutory procurement regulations into one. 
 
• DoD should upgrade the acquisition workforce by establishing an institution 
to provide necessary education and services. 
 
• DoD should reduce the management and administration layers between policy 
and program offices (Fox and Field, 1988:45). 
 
The commission’s report emphasized how uncoordinated and often inconsistent 
the procurement regulations, practices, and procedures were, and how the volumes of 
expensive paperwork continued to increase.  They also stressed the need to stem the 
growing procurement procedure complexity to make doing business with the government 
easier.  The commission reiterated numerous finding from the Fitzhugh commission 
reports, including the use of competitive negotiated contract methods, encouraging 
greater use multiyear contracts, government-wide professional development programs for 
procurement personnel, using metrics to report the progress and status of proposed 
changes, raising the small purchase and economic thresholds from $2,500 to $10,000, 
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introducing an independent operational test and evaluation program, and increasing the 
authority of program managers (Reeves,1996:18). 
Ironically, while many of the recommendations were moves in the right direction, 
pentagon officials still believed that DoD had already made internal shifts in their 
procurement practices from recommendations made earlier by the Fitzhugh commission, 
and that more time was needed to assess their results before additional reforms were 
implemented.  The few recommendations by the commission that were finally 
implemented had lasting effects on the procurement process: Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy created (1974); Contract Disputes Act enacted (1978); Federal 
Acquisition Regulation system established (1980); Competition in Contracting Act 
enacted in (1984); and the legislative formation of the Federal Acquisition Institute 
(1993) (Bair, 1994:15). 
Carlucci Initiatives 
The intensifying Cold War fueled defense spending increases during the last two 
years of the Carter Administration, and President Reagan’s campaign promise for 
accelerated defense buildup (Benson, 1996:19).  The rapid increase in defense spending 
brought with it a new round of changes in the acquisition process.  In 1981, in order to 
manage these reforms, Secretary of Defense Weinberger ordered the Acquisition 
Improvement Task Force; also know as the Defense Acquisition Improvement Program 
(DAIP) to “evaluate all facets of defense acquisition” (Jones, 1999:406).  The team was 
headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci. 
The DAIP released a list of 32 management initiatives, aimed at decreasing 
weapons cost, reducing development time, and improving weapons support and 
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readiness.  Of the initiatives proposed in Table 5, multiyear procurement contracts, 
greater contracting competition, stabilized programs, more realistic budgeting, and more 
fixed-price contracts were eventually established and instituted by DoD (Fox and Field, 
1988: 47-48).  
Table 5.  Carlucci Initiatives (Adams, 1984, 15) 
1. Reaffirm Acquisition Management Principles 17. Decrease DSARC Briefing and Data Requirements
2. Increase Use of Preplanned Product 18. Budget for Inflation
          Improvement 19. Forecast Business Base Conditions
3. Implement Multiyear Procurement 20. Improve Source Selection Process
4. Increase Program Stability 21. Develop and Use Standard Operation and 
5. Encourage Capital Investment to Enhance           Support Systems
          Productivity 22. Provide More Appropriate Design-to-Cost Goals
6. Budget to Most Likely Costs 23. Implement Acquisition Process Decisions
7. Use Economical Production Rates 24. Reduce DSARC Milestones
8. Assure Appropriate Contract Type 25. Submit MENS (later JMSNS) with Service POM
9. Improve System Support and Readiness 26. Revise DSARC Membership
10. Reduce Administrative Costs and Time 27. Retain USDR&E as Defense Acquisition 
11. Budget for Technological Risk           Executive
12. Provide Front-end Funding for Test Hardware 28. Raise Dollar Threshold for DSARC Review
13. Reduce Governmental Legislation Related 29. Integrate DSARC and PPBS Process
          Acquisition 30. Increase PM Visibility of Support Resources
14. Reduce number of DoD Directives 31. Improve Reliability and Support
15. Enhance Funding Flexibility 32. Increase Competition
16. Provide Contractor Incentives to Improve 33. Enhance the Defense Industrial Base 
          Reliability           (added 1984)
 
The Carlucci initiatives addressed some of the longstanding sources of cost 
growth, and many of the themes made their way into the 1982 revision of the DoD 
Directive 5000.1 series, which at the time was the foundation for defense acquisition 
guidance.  The revisions reflected the principles and policies recommended by the 
Acquisition Improvement Program, and are evident in this excerpt from the 1982 version: 
 Improved readiness and sustainability are primary objectives of the acquisition 
process…. Reasonable stability in acquisition programs is necessary to carry out 
effective, efficient, and timely acquisitions.  To achieve stability, DoD 
Components shall conduct effective evolutionary alternatives, estimate and 
budget realistically, [and] plan to achieve economical rates of production. 
(Ferrara, 1996:119) 
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Carlucci believed that in order for the changes to be successful, DoD not only 
required procurement process changes, but also philosophical changes to confront the 
“traditional way of doing business” (Jones, 1999:407).  A July 1996 General Accounting 
Office (GAO) report, assessing the effectiveness of the Carlucci initiatives, found that 
while the reforms were at least partially successful in improving parts of the acquisition 
process, many of the program managers responsible for implementing the changes felt 
that the reforms “had made little or no difference in the acquisition process” (Fox and 
Field, 1988: 48).  The report suggested that the “philosophical” changes Carlucci stressed 
had not been taken, and “senior-level commitment to change had not filtered down to the 
program management level” (Fox and Field, 1988:48).  GAO further emphasized the 
difficulty in implementing the reforms in an environment where “everyone was in a hurry 
to make short-term fixes” (Jones, 1999:407).  Perhaps the most telling comment in the 
GAO’s report was the perception that the “commitment to the improvement program had 
dissipated” (Munechika, 1997:8).  While only five years had passed since the Carlucci 
initiatives were implemented, DoD lost focus executing and monitoring the results; 
ultimately contributing to a perceived failure in the reforms (Holbrook, 2003:10). 
Grace Commission 
During President Reagan’s 1980 campaign run, he pledged to reduce federal 
budget spending by two percent through the identification and elimination of “waste, 
extravagance, abuse, and outright fraud” in federal programs (Bair, 1994:16).  In 1982, to 
follow through with his promise, President Reagan established the President’s Private 
Sector Survey on Cost Control (PPSSCC), also known as the Grace Commission, named 
after its chairperson, Peter J. Grace.  The group consisted of 161 chief executive officers 
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of major corporations and private sector experts; their aim was to identify ways the 
government could be more efficient and reduce costs, either through executive or 
legislative action (Holbrook, 2003:10). 
The Commission recommended 2,478 government reform initiatives to the 
President, with estimated cost savings of $424 billion over three years.  Of the 
recommendations, only 112 pertained directly to DoD, and of these, 12 directly involved 
the acquisition process (US Congress, 1984).  The major acquisition reform initiatives are 
listed below in Table 6. 
Table 6.  Grace Commission Recommendations (House Armed Services Committee, 
1985:3) 
1. Greater use of multiyear contracting to improve program stability
2. Prioritize all weapons systems
3. Streamline and strengthen the contract selection process
4. Upgrade cost estimating
5. Enhance the role, responsibility, authority and accountability of the PM
6. Increase the use of dual sources, throughout the life of the program
7. Increase emphasis on the Spare Parts Breakout Program to identify and obtain spare parts
    from sources other than the Prime Contractor
8. Consolidate responsibility for contract administration activity at the level of OSD
9. Simplify/streamline the 30,000 pages of regulation related to Defense procurement
10. Mandate use of common components, subsystems and equipment by all services
11. Eliminate the use of unnecessary military specifications
12. Outsource commercial functions
 
The main focus of the Commission’s report was an emphasis on “sound business 
practices” to reduce cost overruns rather than slashing those programs experiencing costs 
increases (Bair, 1994:16).  The report identified a compelling need to modernize and 
streamline the acquisition process, and overhaul the organization structure by 
consolidating the procurement function at the OSD level.  Once again the reform theme 
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shifted back to centralized management, as recommended by McNamara more than 20 
years before.  The report asserted: 
The military services have never really bought into the need for central 
management by the SECDEF…Congress continually constricts DoD’s 
management prerogatives…weapons choices…and other major management 
decisions cannot be made in isolation from home district political pressures. 
(Grace Report, 1983:ii) 
 
Critics of the Commission’s claims charged that the estimated potential savings 
were overstated and that many suggestions were not improvements in efficiency or 
eliminations of waste, but rather characterized as changes in national policy (Bair, 
1994:17).  Opponents of the proposals suggested that congressional policy changes were 
necessary for the reforms to be successful, and that Congress would take little or no 
action to ratify any recommendations.  In addition, numerous senior DoD leaders 
believed that many of the recommendations were already being addressed and that the 
department was moving in the right direction under the Carlucci initiatives.  Ultimately, 
both the Grace and Carlucci recommendations lost steam and faded, while cost overruns 
continued to grow (Munechika, 1997:12). 
.Packard Commission 
According to historical budget data from the Congressional Budget Office, 
between 1980 and 1985 Defense outlays increase over 88 percent.  With the tremendous 
increase in spending came several highly publicized procurement horror stories and cost 
overruns that created public doubt about the wisdom of DoD weapons systems purchases 
(Jones, 1999:398).  According to one expert, there were many reasons for alarm in the 
defense acquisition community: 
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In the mid-1980s, an atmosphere of uncertainty, frustration, and apprehension 
pervaded the Pentagon and its contracting base, for each new day brought with it 
additional regulations and concerns that more errors would be uncovered by either 
the press of congressional auditors, investigators, and overseers…the logjam of 
procurement legislation awaiting implementation had become so great that the 
Pentagon and defense industry officials pleaded with Congress for a moratorium 
on further reform legislation. (Fox and Field, 1988:119) 
 
In an effort to curb growing concern, President Reagan responded with the 
formation of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense, better know as the Packard 
Commission, named after its chairperson, former Secretary of Defense David Packard 
(Benson, 1996:20).  The Commission’s charter was to “examine ways to improve defense 
management in general, and defense acquisition specifically” (Ferrara, 1996:119).  Their 
focus was on “broad, structural changes rather than on the smaller issues of fraud, waste, 
and abuse,” which the group felt were symptoms rather than the cause of the problems 
(Jones, 1999:407).   
Less than one year after the Commission was organized, they submitted their final 
report to the President.  The principal recommendations were: 
• Create a new position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
(USD[A]) with responsibility for research, development, procurement and 
testing of all weapon systems. 
 
• Created acquisition executives (AEs) in each Service reporting to both the 
USD(A) and their Service Secretaries. 
 
• Create program executive officers reporting directly to the AEs, each 
overseeing a group of program managers. 
 
• Give the Chairman of the JCS more authority in acquisition matters, create a 
Vice Chairman, and create a Joint Requirements Management Board to 
establish weapons systems requirements, with approval or rejection authority 
at each milestone (Jones, 1999:407). 
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In addition to these recommendations, the Commission developed a “model of 
excellence for defense acquisition,” and provided a “formula for action” to make the 
process more efficient (Munechika, 1997:13).  Table 7 shows the Packard Commissions 
Formula for Action. 
Table 7.  Packard Commission’s Formula for Action 
A. Streamline Acquisition Organization and Procedures
      1. Create new Under Secretary of Defense for Acqusition position
      2. Each service should establish a comparable Service Acquisition Executive (SAE)
      3. Each SAE should appoint Program Executive Officers (PEO)
      4. Program managers report directly to PEOs
      5. Substantially reduce the number of acquisition personnel
      6. Recodify federal laws into a single, greatly simplified statute
B. Use Technology to Reduce Cost
      1. Emphasize building and testing prototypes to demonstrate new technology
      2. Operational testing should begin early in development
      3. Prototypes can provide a basis for improved cost estimating
C. Balance Cost and Performance
      1. Restructure Joint Requirements and Management Board leadership
      2. Joint Requirements Management Board should define weapon requirements and provide 
           tradeoff between cost and performance
D. Stabilize Programs
      1. Baseline programs and use multi-year funding
E. Expand the Use of Commercial Products
      1. Do not rely on military specifications
      2. Use off-the-shelf products as much as possible
F. Increase the Use of Competition
      1. Focus on more effective competition, modeled on commercial practices
      2. Emphasize quality and past performance as well as price
G. Enhance the Quality of Acquisition Personnel
       1. Allow Secretary of Defense to establish flexible personnel management practices
       2. Recommend new personnel management system for acquisition personnel, 
        contracting officers and scientists and engineers  
Both the President and Congress responded enthusiastically to the 
recommendations, and on October 1, 1986, President Reagan signed into law the 
Goldwater-Nichols and Department of Defense Reorganization Act, bringing sweeping 
changes whose principal provisions were to implement the primary Packard 
Commission’s suggestions (Jones, 1999:408).  Shortly after the Commission’s report and 
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this Act, DoD ordered revisions to the DoD 5000.1 series to capture the efforts in the 
basic governing acquisition regulation.   
In 1990, an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition report analyzing the 
reform progress provided specific positive examples of increased cost control and 
stronger program stability: 
• Multiyear contracting.  Seven multiyear programs were approved by Congress 
in the FY 1989 budget, saving an estimated $492 million.  Total savings from 
multiyear procurements from FY 1982 to FY 1989 exceed $7.5 billion. 
 
• Economic production rate.  Of the 34 major defense acquisition programs in 
the DoD, 30 were planed for procurement at or better than the minimum 
economic production rate (Munechika, 1997:15). 
 
After various progress reports on the Commission’s results were positive, and key 
DoD leadership touted the reform a success.  President Reagan’s efforts were viewed by 
some as the most substantive defense acquisition reform achievements to date (Jones, 
1999:407).  However successful the Packard Commission’s efforts, they still were not 
without critics.  Many argued that little progress was made enhancing the quality of DoD 
acquisition personnel (Munechika, 1997:15).  Also, a report published by Christensen et 
al. (1999) analyzing the DAES database for program cost growth, showed that the 
Packard Commissions results did not reduce cost overruns.  It would be the focus of the 
first Bush Administration to aggressively investigation the “success” of the 
Commission’s efforts upon taking office in 1989 (Holbrook, 2003:14). 
Defense Management Review 
Early in 1989, President Bush directed Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to 
develop a plan to ensure the Packard Commission’s recommendations were fully 
implemented; and to further improve and more efficiently manage the defense acquisition 
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system (Cheney, 1989:i).  The DoD in-house study was known as the Defense 
Management Review (DMR).  It assessed from an analytical view how far along the DoD 
was is implementing the Commission’s recommendations, and what remained to be 
accomplished (Holbrook, 2003:14).  The DMR’s initial findings criticized management 
in the acquisition community for the undisciplined management process and 
overburdening regulations (Ferrara, 1996:121).  The Secretary released a list of changes 
that were deemed necessary in order for the President’s objectives at improving the 
procurement system to work: 
• Teamwork among DoD’s senior managers; 
 
• Sound, longer-range planning and better means for managing available 
resources; 
 
• More discipline in what weapon systems we buy and how we buy them; 
 
• Better management of the people we rely on to produce such systems; 
 
• An environment that promotes steady progress in cutting costs and increasing 
quality and productivity; and 
 
• Adherence to the highest ethical standards (Cheney, 1989:27).   
 
DMR also instituted a list of improvements that included “streamlining the 
acquisition chain-of-command from the Defense Acquisition Executive through a newly 
created Service Acquisition Executive (SAE)”, having the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) lead the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to improve requirements 
generation and enhance weapon system performance validation, and strengthening the 
power of the Under Secretary for Acquisition (Hinnant, 1993:6; Jones, 1999:404).   
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By the end of 1991, one of the DMR’s most influential initiatives, entitled 
“Streamlining Contract Management,” had been implemented.  Its aim, a 
recommendation proposed five years earlier by the Grace Commission; was to 
consolidate the Army, Navy, and Air Force contract administrations under a single 
organization – the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (Munechika, 1997:16).  Also in 
1991, came the release of the overhauled DoD 5000 series; a concerted effort to respond 
to the DMR’s critique (Ferrara, 1996:121).  The four main objectives of the rewrite were: 
1) create a uniform system of acquisition policy, 2) discipline the acquisition 
management process, 3) streamline the acquisition regulatory regime, and 4) address the 
litany of common complaints (Ferrara, 1996:121).  The focus of attention in the 
acquisition process after the DMR’s recommendation was a shift “to a more formalized 
report based interaction in which all necessary information would be transmitted in 
writing” (Ferrara, 1996:121).  However, this method would later be reversed because of 
an increase in “red tape” and “bureaucracy”, which down the acquisition process. 
Summary 
This section provided a brief overview of some of the major acquisition reform 
initiatives between 1960 and 1989.  From a historical point of view, it is evident that 
while the reform studies and commissions have changed names, many of the ideas and 
recommendations remained the same between McNamara (1961), Packard (1969 to 
1970), Fitzhugh Commission (1970), Commission on Government Procurement (1972), 
Carlucci Initiatives (1981), Grace Commission (1983), Packard Commission (1986) and 
the Defense Management Review (1989). 
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Current Acquisition Reform Overview (1991 to 2003) 
This section defines the current acquisition reform period as those initiatives 
which were enacted from 1991 to 2003.  This section examines the National Performance 
Review (NPR), the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA), the Clinger-Cohen Act 
of 1996, and the DoDD 5000 series rewrites. 
National Performance Review (NPR) of 1993 and 1995 
The National Performance Review (NPR) focused on transforming the current 
procurement system into one which had more customer service, less bureaucracy, and 
was primarily based on getting value for money (Reinventing Federal Procurement, 
1993:7).  Five major themes were identified and provided the framework for 20 specific 
reform recommendations.  Table 8 identifies the five major NPR themes and summarizes 
some of the key recommendations. 
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Table 8.  NPR Procurement Reform Recommendations (Reinventing Federal 
Procurement, 1993) 
Move to Guiding Principles from Rigid Rules
PROC01 Reframe Acquisition Policy
     - Reduce rules and regulations
PROC02 Build an Innovative Procurement Workforce
      - Better education and training
PROC03 Encourage More Procurement Innovation
     - Test new methods with pilot programs
Get Bureaucracy Out of the Way
PROC04 Establish New Simplified Acquisition Threshold and Procedures
     - Low cost procedures for small purchases
PROC06 Amend Protest Rules
     - Increased communication between buyers and sellers
PROC08 Reform Information Technology Procurement
     - Decrease time to purchase computer equipment
Center Authority and Accountability with Line Managers
PROC09 Lower Costs/Reduce Bureaucracy in Small Purchases though Purchase Card Use 
     - IMPAC Card use
Create Competitive Enterprises
PROC12 Allow for Expanded Choice and Cooperation in use of Supply Schedules
     - Increase Number of Supply Sources
Foster Competitiveness, Commercial Practices, Excellence in Vendor Performance
PROC13 Foster Reliance on the Commercial Marketplace
     - Reduce reliance on government-specific specifications
PROC15 Encourage Best Value Procurement
     - Lowest bidder is not always best!
PROC16 Promote Excellence in Vendor Performance
     - Use past performance in contract award decisions
PROC18 Authorize multiyear contracts  
 “In December 1994, President Clinton asked Vice President Gore to conduct a 
second review of federal agencies, focusing on whether existing functions could be 
terminated, privatized, or restructured” (National Partnership for Reinventing 
Government, 1999:4).  Commonly referred to as Reorganizing Government Phase II 
(REGO II), this second review featured four concurrent efforts which are outlined in 
Table 9. 
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Table 9.  NPR Phase II Procurement Reform Efforts (Reinvention Roundtable 
1995:6)  
Agency Resturcturing (considers three questions)
- If your agency were eliminated, who would pusrue its goals?
- If we must retain this federal role, how can we improve customer service and reduce costs?
- What do you think your customers think about eliminations or changes?
Realigning Relationship of Federal Government with State/Local Partners
- Pass maximum authority and funding to states, localities, and individuals.
- If federal role required, the federal government will be a partner who "steers, not rows."
Regulatory Reform
- Regulators must change the regulatory culture.
Continued Implementation of NPR Phase I
- Agencies will continue to build on successes of NPR Phase I
 
Actual NPR savings appear to be contested between federal agencies; however, 
the importance of the NPR as it relates to this study was that it reinvigorated the 
Acquisition Reform movement in the DoD (Holbrook, 2003:15). 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 
“The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 significantly changed how the 
government does business.  As part of Vice President Gore’s effort to create a 
‘Government That Works Better and Costs Less’ within his National Performance 
Review, he presented FASA to President Clinton in 1983.  It was designed to overhaul 
the cumbersome and complex procurement system of the federal government, which 
required costly paperwork for even small purchases and weeks, sometimes months, of 
waiting between order and delivery of goods” (FASA DSMC, 2002).  To this end, the act 
significantly modified or eliminated over 225 existing statutes. 
“The themes behind the changes made by FASA are a preference for moving to 
commercial contracting methods, transitioning the procurement process to an electronic 
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basis, eliminating paperwork burdens in the procurement cycle, and eliminating non-
value-added requirements” (Statutory/Policy Changes 1999:1).  Table 10 highlights some 
of the changes included in the FASA of 1994. 
Table 10.  Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA DSMC, 2002) 
- Eliminated paperwork and record keeping requirements for purchases under $100,000
- Allowed direct micropurchases of items below $2,500
- Exempted commercial procurements from certain cost accounting standards
     
- Reserved all acquisitions ($2,500 - $100,000) for small business concerns
- Expanded Small Disadvantaged Business program to civilian agency purchases
- Created Small Business Procurement Advisory Council
- Improved bid protest and contract administration procedures
- Required evaluation of past performance before contract award  
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 
In 1996, Congress and the President enacted the Information Technology 
Management Reform Act and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act, which are jointly 
known as the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.  Among other changes, this act required heads 
of Federal agencies to link information technology (IT) investments to agency 
accomplishments and establish a process to select, manage, and control IT expenditures 
(Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, DSMC, 2001).  The following quote by former Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Paul G. Kaminski, summarizes the 
act’s accomplishments. 
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (formerly known as the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA) and the Information Technology 
Management Reform Act of 1996 (ITMRA)) further advance the changes 
made by FASA.  The Clinger-Cohen Act provides a number of significant 
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opportunities for DoD to further streamline and reduce non-value added 
steps in the acquisition process.  Among the most significant changes 
authorized by the Act is a test of the use of the Simplified Acquisition 
Procedures (SAP) for commercial items between the simplified acquisition 
threshold of $100,000 and $5 million.  This should allow DoD to reduce 
its administrative costs and overhead costs for DoD’s vendor base for 
purchases of relatively low risk items.  This change eliminated 
government-unique requirements previously cited by industry as a barrier 
to doing business with DoD.  The Act also provides the authority for 
contracting activities to use SAPs for all requirements between $50,000 
and the SAP while the government works to fully implement Electronic 
Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI). (Clinger-Cohen 
DSMC, 2001) 
 
Overall, changes initiated by the Clinger-Cohen Act provided substantial relief 
from burdensome non-value added processes that increased the cost of IT acquisition 
(Clinger-Cohen DSMC, 2001). 
DoDD 5000 Series Rewrites 
 The DoDD 5000 series has served as the cornerstone for military asset acquisition 
since the 1970s.  In its original form, the 5000 series “mandated a complicated 
acquisition process requiring the government to follow specific rules.  The 5000 series 
also contained supplemental recommendations and suggested guidelines and other 
mandatory rules that applied only in certain circumstances.  The process was very 
detailed but was an attempt to ensure that the U.S. Government purchase only the highest 
quality equipment” (DoD Directive 5000.1 and 5000.2-R Rewrite, 2001); however, 
continued efforts towards a more efficient acquisition system clearly identified the need 
to revise the Series. 
 In 1997, the first drastically revised DoDD 5000 series was released to realign 
acquisition guidelines with current legislation.  The rewrite focused on the following four 
streamlined acquisition processes. 
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• It incorporated new laws and policies. 
• It separated mandatory policies and procedures from discretionary practices. 
• It reduced the volume of internal regulatory guidance. 
• It integrated, for the first time ever, acquisition policies and procedures for 
both weapon systems and automated information systems (DoD Directive 
5000.1 and DoD 5000.2-R Rewrite, DSMC, 2001). 
 
This newly revised DoD 5000 series was dramatically simplified, going from more than 
1,000 pages in its original form to merely 160 pages with this revision. 
 In 2002, the DoD 5000 series was again radically modified.  This time the entire 
publication was suspended from use until a more flexible guideline could be created.  In a 
October 30, 2002 memorandum, Undersecretary of Defense Wolfowitz canceled the DoD 
5000 Defense Acquisition Policy Documents stating “I have determined that the current 
subject documents require revision to create an acquisition policy environment that 
fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity, and innovation” (Wolfowitz, 2002). 
 A new DoD 5000 series emerged in 2003 to satisfy the functional criteria 
established by Undersecretary Wolfowitz.  Since the 2003 revision exceeds the scope of 
this research, the details will not be discussed in this report. 
Summary 
 Current period reform initiatives are not much different than their predecessors, as 
the push to eliminate bureaucracy for more cost effective acquisition seems to permeate 
from decade to decade.  From one current reform initiative to another, commonalities 
include streamlining regulatory guidelines, implementing commercial practices, and 
providing the end-user more flexibility. 
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Cost Growth Studies 
This section summarizes recent research studies which focus on quantifying cost 
growth in DoD acquisition and measuring the effectiveness of acquisition reform 
initiatives.  These studies provide the motivation and methodology for this research 
1993 Drezner et al. Study 
The Drezner study attempted to identify the extent of a historical cost growth 
problem in DoD acquisition by focusing on two primary research objectives: 
• Quantify the magnitude of cost growth in weapon systems. 
• Identify factors affecting cost growth. 
Utilizing the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) as of December 1990, a 
database of 197 major weapon systems was compiled for cost growth analysis.  Two 
significant findings resulted from this study.  First, the researchers found “no substantial 
improvement in average cost growth over the last 30 years, despite the implementation of 
several initiatives intended to mitigate the effects of cost risk and the associated cost 
growth.  In fact, [their] results suggest that cost growth has remained about 20 percent 
over this time period” (Drezner et al., 1993:xiv).  Second, “researchers could not 
definitely account for the observed cost growth patterns.  Thus, no ‘silver bullet’ policy 
option is available for mitigating cost growth” (Drezner et al., 1993:xi); however, “the 
two factors that have the greatest effect on total program cost growth are program size 
and maturity” (Drezner et al., 1993:xii). 
The 1993 Drezner study identified troubling results about cost growth in the DoD 
acquisition process.  To determine if the cost growth pattern continues through 2001, the 
RAND study is utilized as the guideline for this thesis research. 
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1999 Christensen et al. Study 
Christensen’s research added further support for the 20 percent average annual 
cost growth identified in the 1993 Drezner report, finding similar results with the Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) database as Drezner found with the SAR 
database (Christensen et al., 1999:251).  More specifically, this study analyzed an eight 
year window around the implementation of the Packard Commission’s recommendations 
to determine if cost growth improved because of these reform efforts.  Christensen’s 
research identified that the Packard Commission’s recommendations “did not reduce the 
average overrun percent experienced on 269 completed defense acquisition contracts over 
an eight year period (1988 through 1995).  In fact, the cost performance experienced on 
development contracts and on contracts managed by the Air Force worsened significantly 
(Christensen et al., 1999:251).  Failure of the Packard Commission’s recommendations to 
control cost growth as designed reveals the need for continued monitoring of newly 
implemented acquisition reform efforts. 
2003 Holbrook Thesis 
The Holbrook study “focuses on the timeline of current reform initiative 
implementation, with an emphasis on cost reduction-focused initiatives.  This study 
assesses if DoD weapon system contract cost performance is improving or not and how 
any cost performance trends (positive or negative) relate to the implementation timeline” 
(Holbrook, 2003:3).  The use of the DAES database enabled Holbrook to apply earned 
value management calculations to assess cost growth.  Although Holbrook used a 
different database and methodology than the ones applied in this study, his research 
provides a unique perspective into the correlation of cost growth and acquisition reform. 
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Holbrook’s thesis is based on two specific research objectives. 
First, “to determine if a mapping between cost initiatives and cost growth  
improvement exists and if so, what is the time period between implementation of  
an initiative and the results.  Second, based on this relationship the focus will be  
on developing a model or ‘rule of thumb’ to estimate or forecast an impact  
window or time frame in which to expect results for future cost-related acquisition  
reform policies. (Holbrook, 2003:4) 
 
His research focused on 204 contracts completed between January 1, 1994 and 
December 31, 2001 (Holbrook, 2003:xi).  The analysis identified that cost growth was no 
different in contracts completed after acquisition reform implementation than it was in 
those contracts completed before acquisition reform implementation.  In addition, the 
research investigated cost performance on all active contracts from 1970 to 2002 with 
acquisition reform studies and commissions over the same time period to examine any 
trends or time lags between reform implementation and contract cost performance 
change.  The study results “indicate some evidence of cost performance change following 
the different studies and commissions” (Holbrook 2003, xi). 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter defined missile system programs and specified their relative impact 
on the DoD budget.  The chapter also identified the long history of acquisition reform 
initiatives up to 2003, revealing the legislative impact on the DoD acquisition process.  
Finally, recent cost growth studies were reviewed to establish a baseline viewpoint on the 
extent of weapon system cost growth in the DoD. 
This thesis utilizes the past cost growth studies identified above to identify if cost 
growth is still plaguing the DoD acquisition process today.  Hypothesizing that cost 
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growth will be found in the major missile programs from 1991 to 2001, further analysis 
will be performed to identify if acquisition reform initiatives have made any impact on 
reducing the amount of cost growth a program incurs.  The methodology for this research 
is described in Chapter III. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
Chapter Overview 
Two fundamental questions arise when performing weapon system cost growth 
analysis: 1) how to accurately quantify cost growth and 2) whether or not acquisition 
reform initiatives have made a difference on weapon system cost growth.  The issue of 
cost growth calculation centers on what adjustments must be made to normalize for 
inflation, changes in baseline quantities, and the phenomenon of cost improvements with 
increasing production quantities.  To determine if acquisition reform has impacted cost 
growth, pre-reform and post-reform periods of analysis must be identified.  This chapter 
explains the analysis methods used in this research effort, describes the database and data 
used, and explains the phases of analysis conducted. 
Data Collection 
The basic source of information in this cost growth analysis is from Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SAR), which are the primary documents submitted by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) to Congress regarding the status of major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAP) (Jarvaise et al., 1996:3).  To minimize interpretive errors 
in this research, data was extracted from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) cost growth database.  The OSD CAIG 
database compiles all historical SAR data into a Microsoft Excel workbook, while 
incorporating expert judgment in classifying many areas that are reliant on interpretation, 
such as quantity-related cost variances.  This electronic database not only facilitates 
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specific program data extraction, but also mitigates some SAR limitations discussed in 
Chapter I. 
MDAPs reporting SARs are acquisition programs that are “not highly sensitive 
classified programs” as determined by the Secretary of Defense but are: 
• Designated by the Secretary of Defense as an MDAP, or 
 
• Estimated by the Secretary of Defense to require an eventual total expenditure 
of more than $300 million (based on fiscal year 1990 constant dollars) 
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) or an eventual total 
expenditure for procurement of more than $1.8 billion (based on fiscal year 
1990 constant dollars) (10 U.S.C., 2430). 
 
SARs are developed by the Program Management Offices (PMOs) and provide 
data on the cost, schedule, and performance status of MDAPs at regular intervals 
(Jarvaise et al., 1996:3).  Annual SARs are mandatory for MDAPs 60 days after the date 
on which the President’s Budget is submitted to Congress, and cover data as of 31 
December.  Quarterly SARs are reported on an exception basis if the program meets the 
following criteria: 
• 15% or more increase in the procurement estimate of the Program Acquistion 
Unit Cost (PAUC) compared to the PAUC in the currently approved 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APBA), or 
 
• 15% or more increase in the current estimate of the Average Procurement Unit 
Cost (APUC) compared to the APUC in the currently approved APB, or 
 
• Six-month of greater delay in the current estimate of any schedule milestone 
since the current estimated reported in the previous SAR, or 
 
• Milestone B, Milestone C, or Full Rate Production Decision Review 
(Milestones II or III for grandfathered programs) and associated APB 
approval within 90 days prior to the quarter end date (DoD 5000.2-I). 
 
Data used in this study is from the 1991 through 2001 annual missile system SAR 
reports and is current as of December 2001.  The schedule, technical, and cost 
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information listed in the SAR is reported in terms of “baseline, approved program, and 
current estimates” (Jarvaise et al., 1996:3).  For the purpose of this research the sections 
on program acquisition costs, which include “all such costs from program inception to 
completion regardless of the program’s stage of development” (Hough, 1992:4), are of 
interest and used in the data collection and analysis. 
Two estimates of cost are provided in a SAR and are allocated to the following 
appropriations: Development (RDT&E), procurement, and military construction 
(MILCON).  The first cost is a baseline estimate that can be made for each of the three 
Milestones: Milestone I (A) or the planning estimate (PE), Milestone II (B) or the 
development estimate (DE), and Milestone III (C) or production estimate (PE) (Hough, 
1992:4).  The second is “the current estimate that includes actual schedule, technical, and 
cost information for the most recent estimate available” (Jarvaise et al., 1996:3).  The 
costs are reported in both base year (BY) and then year (TY) dollars millions.  The DE, 
or Milestone II (B) estimate, is associated with the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) start, and has been the most common baseline for calculating cost 
growth: 
For many types of descriptive and statistical analyses, cost growth is referenced to 
the DE baseline since prior to Milestone 2 (B), capability and configuration trade-
offs are often still in the process of being resolved.  Using this baseline also 
establishes a weapon system of reasonably constant scope in cost growth 
analyses. (Jarvaise et al., 1996: 12) 
 
Therefore, the Milestone II (B) estimate is used as the baseline in this research. 
Finally, a change in the quantity of weapons systems from baseline to current 
estimates is reported each year in the program acquisition cost section of the SAR, and 
identifies the quantity of weapons systems to be procured for the given estimate as well 
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as the baseline estimate (Hough, 1992:4).  Data from this section of the SAR report is 
used when making quantity normalization adjustments covered in the Phase I section of 
the methodology. 
Phase I 
Research Objective 
Chapter II outlined a 1993 RAND report that measures MDAP cost growth from 
the mid-1960s to 1990 using SARs.  The research revealed that the average cost growth 
for all weapons systems was around 20 percent, while missile systems averaged 17 
percent.  To get a current measure of the state of missile systems cost growth, this phase 
of the study measures cost growth using missile systems SARs from 1991 to 2001. 
Population and Sample 
The data population for this research encompasses all missile systems that 
reported SARs during 1991 to 2001.  The sample selected from this population for Phase 
I includes only those programs with a reported Milestone II baseline.  A total of 21 
missile system programs and 135 SARs have been included in this research. 
Data Normalization 
 Generally, cost growth is identified as the change between the baseline estimate 
and the current estimate.  There are two primary approaches to measuring cost growth: 
unadjusted costs and adjusted costs.  The unadjusted method measures cost growth in 
then-year dollars and excludes any changes in procurement quantity or inflation.  The 
unadjusted procedure is used when measuring the impact of cost growth on the federal 
budget and is favored by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and Congress “because it 
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reflects the budgetary impact of all program cost changes regardless of what conditions 
are responsible for the change” (Hough, 1992: 10).  Adjusted cost growth is calculated in 
constant year (CY) dollars to eliminate the effects of inflation, and accounts for changes 
in procurement quantities.  The adjusted cost growth approach, which is modified and 
used in this research, is preferred when “determining how well program management has 
done in estimating and controlling costs” within its weapon system program (Drezner et 
al., 1993:10).  The adjusted cost growth methodology is used in this research. 
Inflation Adjustment 
The initial step in adjusting cost data using SARs is to remove the effects of 
inflation, which are outside the control of weapon system programs and serve only to 
disguise the true level of cost growth when left unadjusted.  The SAR provides data in 
both BY and TY dollars, so the effects of inflation can be overcome by extracting cost 
data and calculating cost growth factors in BY dollars (Jarvaise et al., 1996:20).  
However, a common occurrence within the SARs is that the baseline may change for a 
particular program.  Therefore, to perform cost growth analysis that will remain 
consistent throughout, all data calculations must be adjusted to a CY, thus eliminating the 
effects of changing baselines and inflation by removing changes in the value of money 
over time (Drezner et al., 1993:21).  All values in this research are adjusted by applying 
the OSD CY 2000 inflation indices, and shown in dollars in millions. 
Quantity Adjustment 
After the inflation adjustments have been made the next step in normalizing the 
data is to remove the effects of quantity changes from the baseline estimate.  While 
adjusting for inflation is fairly straightforward, the same cannot be said for quantity 
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normalization; it is critical to explain exactly how the calculations are accomplished.  
General steps and formulas for calculating adjusted cost growth are provided in this 
chapter along with adjusted cost growth calculations using the Patriot missile SAR data, 
as of December 2001, to illustrate the use of this model in practical context.  In addition, 
all missile system adjusted cost growth and learning curve calculations are provided in 
Appendices A to V. 
Before initial adjustments are made, it must first be decided whether to recalculate 
the current estimate to the baseline quantity or to adjust the baseline quantity to the 
current quantity.  When normalizing to the current quantity, a floating baseline is created 
as the procurement quantity changes, which can lead to contrasting measures of cost 
growth when there are large changes in the production quantity.  On the other hand, 
normalizing to the baseline quantity will “theoretically give the same cost-growth factor 
whether subsequent quantities are increased or decreased” (Hough, 1992: 30).  This 
method is approved and used by most research firms conducting cost growth analysis, 
and is therefore adopted for this study. 
Once a normalization quantity has been selected, the first procedure for adjusting 
the quantity is to calculate the current procurement variance (CPV).  This is 
accomplished by subtracting the baseline procurement estimate (BPROC) from the 
current procurement estimate (CPROC) as expressed by Equation 1 (Leonard, 2003). 
 
CPV = CPROC – BPROC          (1)
 
Patriot CPV calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 1992 SAR: 
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4356.45 = 11963.64 – 7607.20 
 
The second step is to calculate the current and cumulative quantity-related cost 
variances associated with procurement estimates from Section 13 of the SAR.  The 
Variances in “RDT&E and military construction are not normalized because they are 
usually (but not always) independent of changes in the procurement quantity” (Hough, 
1992: 33).  There are two types of quantity related cost variances that must be considered; 
primary and secondary. 
Primary quantity-related cost variances (PQRCV) are costs increases or decreases 
that are directly attributed to a quantity change, and are identified in Section 13 of the 
SAR under the cost variance category “Quantity.”  Secondary quantity-related cost 
variances (SQRCV) are known costs effects of a quantity change, such as an increase in 
initial spare parts as a result of increase in procurement quantity that are not directly 
related with the end item, and thus not reported in the “Quantity” category (Hough, 1992: 
31).  The secondary quantity effects are reported under the schedule, engineering, and 
estimating cost variances categories and can be subjectively identified as resulting from a 
quantity change by reading the current variance narrative explanations in Section 13 of 
the SAR.  The SAR database provided by the OSD identified the secondary quantity-
related variances extracted from the SAR cost variance narratives, and this thesis makes 
use of those values. 
Once the primary and secondary quantity-related variances are identified, a total 
quantity-related cost variance (TQRCV) is calculated by summing the primary and 
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secondary quantity-related variances for each year as shown in Equation 2 (Leonard, 
2003). 
 
TQRCV = PQRCV + SQRCV          (2)
 
Patriot TQRCV calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 1992 
SAR: 
 
0.00 = 0.00 + 0.00 
 
A total quantity-related cumulative cost variance (TQRCVcum) must then be calculated by 
summing the TQRCV for all previous years as shown in Equation 3 (Leonard, 2003). 
 
TQRCVcum = ∑
n
iTQRCV
1
           (3)
                                           i  = the ith year in sample 
                                           n = total number of years in the sample                  
 
Patriot TQRCVcum calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 1992 
SAR: 
 
TQRCVcum = 1913.42  
 
The third step is to calculate a net procurement, or residual variance (RV), by 
subtracting the quantity-related variance from the total procurement variance.  The 
residual variance is the difference between the baseline estimate and current estimate 
after quantity-related costs are removed.  In essence, residual variance is non-quantity-
related cost variance and is expressed by Equation 4 (Leonard, 2003). 
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RV = CPV - TQRCVcum          (4)
 
Patriot RV calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 1992 SAR: 
 
2443.03 = 4356.45 – 1913.42 
 
The fourth normalization step is to calculate the production learning curve slope 
(LCS) and theoretical first unit cost (T1).  These calculations are performed using the 
cumulative average learning curve theory methodology for lot data.  Cumulative average 
learning curve for lot data generally entails applying linear regression to the cumulative 
cost of producing a cumulative number of units.  The production learning curve and T1 
are created from the regression output.  The LCS is “the constant factor by which cost 
decreases as the production units double and is usually expressed as a percentage” 
(SCEA, 2002:6).  This concept is shown in Figure 2. 
 Learning Curve Concept
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Figure 2.  Cumulative Average Learning Curve Slope (McCrillis, 2003) 
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Normalizing using the LCS affects the data by either increasing or decreasing the 
amount of a program’s cost variance.  A weapon system’s baseline cost “is established 
assuming a specific quantity of units.  As the number of units increases, the unit cost will 
go down even though the program cumulative total cost increases.  As the number of 
units decreases, the unit cost increases even though the program cumulative total 
decreases” (McCrillis, 2003).  This concept is shown in Figure 3 for a notational baseline 
program. 
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Figure 3.  Baseline Program Normalization (McCrillis, 2003) 
The lines above and below the baseline program line in Figure 3 represent programs with 
positive and negative cost growth.  The significance of adjustment depends on the 
“percentage of quantity change, how early in the program the quantity changed, the 
direction of the quantity change, and the steepness of the slope” (Hough, 1992:35). 
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To assess whether a program has experienced cost growth or cost reductions, the 
variances must be normalized back to the baseline quantity.  The basic steps for 
determining a LCS are listed below. 
• Gather available data and normalize it (e.g., convert to CY dollars), as 
necessary, 
 
• Perform any necessary operations on the data and transform into log space; 
 
• Plot the data to determine if learning curve analysis is suitable (should 
approximate a line in log space); 
 
• Determine the log-space linear equation, generally using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression; 
 
• Transform the result back into unit space; and 
 
• Finally, calculate your answers (SCEA, 2002:11). 
 
Data required for developing a LCS is provided in the procurement breakout of 
Section 16 (Program Funding Summary) in the SAR.  This section, which became 
regularly available beginning with the December 1985 SAR, displays the fiscal year 
procurement quantities and funding numbers for both completed (i.e., “actual”) and 
future years production.  In some cases, limiting the LCS calculations to completed 
production years will result in an insignificant number of data points.  Therefore, the 
preferred method is to use the entire procurement breakout, with both completed and 
projected production cost and quantities, which will produce more realistic and robust 
total cost-quantity curves.  In addition, when developing a LCS to normalize the current 
estimate to the baseline quantity, the current estimated Program Funding Summary data 
from the most recent SAR should be applied (Hough, 1992: 34). 
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Once Program Funding Summary data has been assembled from Section 16 of the 
SAR, the cumulative average unit cost (CAUC) and cumulative units produced (CUP) 
must be calculated for each year.  The CAUC is calculated by summing the cost of all 
lots up to and including the current one and then dividing by the CUP.  The CAUC and 
CUP must then be transformed into log space (SCEA, 2002:6). 
The next step is to plot the log-space data using a scatter plot to determine if the 
data reasonably approximates a straight line.  The ln(CUP) is plotted on the horizontal 
axis and the ln(CAUC) on the vertical axis (SCEA, 2002:6).  For normalizing cost growth 
data, a coefficient of determination of 0.70 or higher is generally accepted (Hough, 
1992:39), and goodness of fit regression statistics can be used to determine if the data is 
statistically significant.  In any case where the fit does not meet the criteria, the average 
LCS for that type of system can be used (Hough, 1992:39). 
After the data has been deemed acceptable for cumulative average theory, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression can determine the line passing through the log-
space data points; providing the y-intercept and slope of the line.  This operation can 
easily be done with Microsoft Excel regression analysis and most statistical software 
packages.  The y-intercept and slope of the line are the two key data points that must be 
transformed back to unit space (SCEA, 2002:6). 
Transforming the y-intercept back to unit space provides the T1, which is used to 
best fit the available historical data.  Transformation is done by exponentiating the y-
intercept as shown in Equation 5 (SCEA, 2002:16). 
 48
 
 
 
 
To arrive at the LCS, the percentage by which cost decreases as production units double, 
the value two is raised to the log-space slope multiplied by the natural log of two as 
expressed in Equation 6 (SCEA, 2002:16).  An explanation of how the T1 and LCS are 
incorporated into the normalization process is addressed later in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 details the Patriot missile LCS calculations using 1992 SAR (final 
program SAR) program funding summary data in BY 1972 dollars in millions. 
Table 11. Patriot Missile LCS Calculations 
Lot #
Cum 
Units
Cum 
PROC 
BY$ CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 117 241.50 2.06 4.76 0.72 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 247 456.40 1.85 5.51 0.61 -0.15 1.43 4.18 0.90
3 423 740.50 1.75 6.05 0.56 -0.13 1.34 3.81 0.91
4 710 1042.10 1.47 6.57 0.38 -0.18 1.59 4.91 0.88
5 1150 1357.00 1.18 7.05 0.17 -0.23 1.89 6.64 0.85
6 1590 1683.30 1.06 7.37 0.06 -0.26 2.04 7.66 0.83
7 2150 1975.80 0.92 7.67 -0.08 -0.28 2.17 8.74 0.82
8 2850 2262.20 0.79 7.96 -0.23 -0.31 2.30 9.94 0.81
9 3565 2526.80 0.71 8.18 -0.34 -0.32 2.40 11.06 0.80
10 4380 2762.30 0.63 8.38 -0.46 -0.34 2.50 12.21 0.79
11 5340 2942.60 0.55 8.58 -0.60 -0.36 2.61 13.56 0.78
12 6475 3135.90 0.48 8.78 -0.73 -0.37 2.71 15.06 0.77
13 6915 3191.90 0.46 8.84 -0.77 -0.39 2.79 16.33 0.76  
 
T1 = eln(a)                                   (5) 
                                              e  = natural log base 
                                         ln(a) = log-space y-intercept                                         
 
LCS = eb*ln(2)                                   (6) 
                                               e = natural log base 
                                               b = log-space slope                                                  
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The calculations above result in a TI BY cost of $16.33 and a learning curve slope 
of 0.76.  For consistency, the theoretical first unit cost is converted to CY 2000 dollars: 
CY T1 = $61.21. 
The fifth step is to compute the theoretical cost of the baseline quantity (TCBQ) 
by applying the production learning curve and the T1 values as expressed by Equation 7 
(Leonard, 2003).  This equation was adopted from previous RAND research on cost 
growth calculations and estimates the theoretic cost of the baseline program quantity 
given the current production learning curve. 
 
 
TCBQ = BQ * T1 * BQ^(ln(LCS)/ln(2))        (7)
 
Patriot TCBQ calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 1992 
SAR: 
 
1134.83 = 117*61.21*117^(ln(0.76)/ln(2)) 
 
The sixth step is to compute the theoretical cost of the current quantity (TCCQ) 
by applying the production learning curve and the T1 values as expressed by Equation 8 
(Leonard, 2003).  This equation was adopted from previous RAND research on cost 
growth calculations and estimates the theoretic cost of the current program quantity given 
the current production learning curve. 
 
 
TCCQ = CQ * T1 * CQ^(ln(LCS)/ln(2))        (8)
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Patriot TCCQ calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 1992 
SAR:  
 
13842.01 = 6915*61.21*6915^(ln(0.76)/ln(2)) 
 
The final step is to identify the calculated quantity-related cost variance 
(CQRCV), which represents the theoretical value of cost growth relative to the baseline 
estimate at the baseline quantity, and is expressed by Equation 9 (Leonard, 2003). 
 
 
CQRCV = RV * TCBQ/TCCQ       (9)
 
Patriot CQRCV calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 1992 
SAR:  
 
200.29 = 2443.03*1134.83/13842.01 
 
Research Variable 
Once the normalization adjustments are made to the data, the research variable, 
adjusted cost growth factor (ACGF), can be calculated for each SAR year.  Adjusted cost 
growth can be represented in many ways: dollars, percentage, or as a factor.  This 
research focuses on adjusted cost growth as a factor of the baseline estimate and is 
calculated by summing the current RDTE estimate (CRDTE), the BPROC estimate plus 
the CQRCV, and the current MILCON estimate (CMILCON), then dividing by the sum 
of the baseline RDTE (BRDTE), BPROC, and the baseline MILCON (BMILCON) as 
shown in Equation 10 (Drezner et al., 1993:12). 
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 (10)               BMILCON)BPROC(BRDTE               
/))((ACGF
++
+++= CMILCONCQRCVBPROCCRDTE
  
 
Patriot ACGF calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 1992 
SAR:  
 
1.08 = (5694.39 + (7607.20 + 200.29) + 206.34)/ 
                 (5063.03 + 7607.20 + 27.21) 
 
The ACGF calculations are performed on each SAR submission for all programs 
in the research sample, thereby identifying annual ACGFs as well as total program 
ACGFs.  An ACGF greater than 1.0 represents a program that incurred cost growth, 
while an ACGF less than 1.0 identifies favorable cost performance within a program. 
Phase I Summary 
This section identified the Phase I research objective and established the research 
population, sample, and variable.  A detailed description of the methodology with 
equations and examples for data normalization to adjust for inflation, quantity changes, 
and cost improvements over time was provided.  Finally, an explanation for quantifying 
adjusted cost growth as a factor was given. 
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Phase II 
Research Objective 
Chapter II identified Department of Defense acquisition reform attempts from 
1991 to 2001 aimed at streamlining the procurement process and reducing weapon 
systems cost growth.  A GAO report to Congress measuring the success of key Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining ACT (FASA) initiatives as of the end of fiscal year 1996, 
indicates “that the organizations [they] reviewed were working toward achieving key 
FASA purposes,” and “to reach meaningful conclusions about the extent of 
success…additional data would have to be collected and examined for subsequent fiscal 
years” (GAO/NSIAD-98-81:3).  In another report on reform status in a 1997 statement 
before the House Committee on National Security, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD, AT&L) Kaminski stated: “DoD has 
achieved a large measure of success with acquisition reform,” and the “Department has 
made a number of critical and historical changes that are now being institutionalized and 
beginning to bear fruit” (Kaminski, 1997).  Additionally, a 1997 GAO report on the 
effect of acquisition reform on weapon system funding identified that $7.2 billion in cost 
reductions from approved budgets were expected between fiscal year 1995 and 2002 
(GAO/NSIAD-98-31:2).  Considering all of the preceding comments, one should expect 
annual cost growth to decrease over time. 
The second objective of this thesis is to analyze if current acquisition reform 
initiatives have indeed had any impact on missile systems cost growth.  Thus, a cut-off 
treatment date, as well as pre and post reform analysis windows, must be identified for 
cost growth comparison.  The broad and encompassing policy changes of 1991 to 2001 
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naturally occur over time, and it is “nearly impossible to determine a precise date of 
implementation for the aggregate change” (Searle, 1997:44).  As a result, consistent with 
the Holbrook and Searle studies, this date is judgmentally selected as 31 December 1996 
(Holbrook, 2003:35; Searle, 1997:45).  The cut-off treatment date for this study is chosen 
for the following reasons: 
• GAO report that as of the end of fiscal year 1996 the DoD was in compliance 
with FASA and that additional data would need to be collected and examined 
for subsequent years; 
 
• Passage of Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996; 
• DoDD 5000 Series revision released in 1997; 
• Speech by USD, AT&L Kaminski regarding success to date in 1997; and 
• GAO report estimating $7.2 billion reduction in budget from 1995 to 2002 
due to the effects of acquisition reform on weapon system funding. 
 
This cut-off treatment date allows for six years of pre-reform and five years of 
post reform SAR data in the study, and provides enough time to mitigate bias due to 
factors such as fluctuations in the defense business cycle (Wandland & Wickman, 
1993:28).  Therefore, this study will use various statistical techniques to test missile 
systems cost growth for the pre-reform period samples (1 January 1991 to 31 December 
1996) to the after reform period samples (1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001) in order 
to make inferences about the difference between population cost growth parameters if 
one exists. 
Population and Sample 
The data population for this research encompasses all missile systems that 
reported SARs during 1991 to 2001.  A pre-reform and post-reform sample is selected 
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from this population for Phase II analysis.  The pre-reform sample includes only those 
programs from 1991 to 1996 that reported a Milestone II baseline estimate.  A total of 20 
missile systems and 76 SARs are included in the pre-reform sample.  Similarly, the post-
reform sample includes only those programs from 1997 to 2001 that reported a Milestone 
II baseline estimate.  A total of 13 missile systems and 59 SARs are included in the post-
reform sample. 
Research Variable 
This study analyzes the impact of acquisition reform on cost growth and utilizes 
the mean pre-reform ACGFs (mean ACGFpre-reform) and the mean post reform ACGFs 
(mean ACGFpost-reform) as the research variables.  Generating these two research variables 
requires two mathematical steps.  First, calculate the mean annual adjusted cost growth 
factor (ACGF) as expressed by Equation 11. 
 
nACGFACGF
n
ij /
1






= ∑                 11 
                                           i  = the ith ACGF in sample year j 
                                           n = total number of programs in year j                          
 
Then calculate the mean ACGF for pre-reform and post-reform samples as expressed by 
Equations 12 and 13. 
 
nACGFACGF
n
ireformpre /
1






= ∑−             12 
                                           i  = the ith year in sample 
                                           n = total number of years in sample                               
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nACGFACGF
n
ireformpost /
1






= ∑−            13 
                                           i  = the ith year in sample 
                                           n = total number of years in sample                              
 
The research variables mean ACGFpre-reform and mean ACGFpost-reform are then analyzed in 
a hypothesis test to determine the impact of acquisition reform on cost growth. 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
Research question:  Is the mean ACGF for pre-reform (1 January 1991 to 31 
December 1996) missile systems different than the mean ACGF for post-reform (1 
January 1997 to 31 December 2001) missile systems?  To answer this question, the 
following hypothesis is tested: 
Ho: mean ACGFpre-reform = mean ACGFpost-reform 
Ha: mean ACGFpre-reform ≠ mean ACGFpost-reform 
If the null hypothesis is true, then there is no statistical difference in cost growth between 
the pre and post reform periods.  This would indicate that current acquisition reform 
initiatives did not statistically impact cost growth.  If the alternate hypothesis is true, then 
there is a statistical difference between the pre and post reform periods.  This would 
indicate that current acquisition reform initiatives did impact cost growth. 
Statistical Analysis 
The principal analysis used in Phase II involves applying statistical tests to 
determine whether significant differences exist between population means.  The first step 
in the analysis is to determine if the required assumptions are met to perform either 
parametric or nonparametric techniques.  Parametric statistical tests, like the z-test for 
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large samples (n > 30) and t-test for small independent samples (n < 30), involve making 
inferences about population parameters when the data sampled are from a normally 
distributed population.  Nonparametric tests, like the Wilcoxon rank sum test (a.k.a. the 
Mann-Whitney test) for making inferences about two population means and commonly 
referred to as distribution-free tests, do not require the data to be normally distributed 
(McClave et al., 2001:888). 
If the two population means have samples where (n > 30) the z-test can be used 
since the Central Limit Theorem states that “for sufficiently large samples the sampling 
distribution of the sample mean is approximately normal” (McClave et al., 2001:273).  
However, if (n < 30) for the two population means the small sample t-test must be used 
and an assessment of normality must be conducted (McClave et al., 2001:399).  Since (n 
< 30) for the data in this research, tests to determine the appropriateness of the small 
sample t-test will be conducted. 
The small sample t-test is the appropriate parametric statistical test for comparing 
two populations with independent sampling and small sample sizes (Sheskin, 2000:247).  
In order to use the parametric small sample t-test several assumptions must be validated: 
both sampled populations must be approximately normally distributed with equal 
population variances, and the random samples must be selected independently of each 
other (McClave et al., 2001:399).  If the assumptions are met and the small sample t-test 
result is significant we can conclude with confidence that “there is a high likelihood that 
the samples represent populations with different means” (Sheskin, 2000:247). 
If the assumption of normality is violated for the small sample t-test, then an 
analogous nonparametric test like the Wilcoxon rank sum test can be used (McClave et 
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al., 2001:895).  It can be proven “that the Wilcoxon rank sum test and the Mann-Whitney 
U test are equivalent” (McClave et al., 2001:897), and “although they employ different 
equations and different tables, the two versions of the test yield comparable results 
(Sheskin, 2000:289).  There are a number of assumptions necessary for the validity of the 
Wilcoxon ran sum test: the two samples are random and independent, and the two 
probability distributions from which the samples are drawn are continuous (McClave et 
al., 2001:897).  The Wilcoxon rank sum test is considered by many statisticians to be the 
best nonparametric method used to test the hypothesis that the probability distributions 
associated with two populations are equivalent (Gibbons, 1971:149). 
The hypothesis testing applied in this thesis will use an observed significance 
level (alpha value [α]) of .05.  The appropriate test statistic values will be given, and will 
be explained using p-values.  The p-value for a specific statistical test is the “probability 
(assuming Ho is true) of observing a value of the test statistic that is at least contradictory 
to the null hypothesis” (McClave et al., 2001:354), and is the smallest level of 
significance at which the null hypothesis would be rejected (Devore, 2000:342).  If the 
observed p-value is less than the alpha level (.05), reject the null hypothesis; otherwise do 
not reject the null hypothesis (McClave et al. 2001: 356).  Table 12 displays the 
acceptance and rejection criteria for the tests using p-values. 
Table 12.  Hypothesis Test Decision Table (Holbrook, 2003:44) 
P-value ≤ .05 ⇒ reject H0 at level .05 
P-value > .05 ⇒ do not reject H0 at level .05
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Data Preparation 
Prior to conducting hypothesis testing, the parametric and nonparametric test 
assumptions must be compared.  Validation of the small sample t-test requires that the 
data be assessed for independence, randomness, normality and constant variance.  If the 
test for normality or constant variance is not met, the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum 
test will be used.  Assumptions for both the parametric small sample t-test and 
nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test are displayed in Table 13. 
Table 13.  Assumptions 
small sample t-test Wilcoxon rank sum test 
1.  All samples are random samples 
from their respective populations. 
1.  All samples are random samples 
from their respective populations. 
2.  All samples are independently 
selected from their respective 
populations. 
2.  All samples are independently 
selected from their respective 
populations. 
3.  Both sampled populations have 
relative frequency distributions that 
are approximately normal. 
3.  The two probability distributions 
from which the samples are drawn 
are continuous. 
4.  The population variances are 
equal.   
 
Independence 
Independence of the data was assumed based on the following: 
• Likeness caused by legislation and regulation would affect cost performance 
equally across all DoD programs; and 
 
• Multiple systems under similar program managers are run by a multitude of 
cost management contractors and personnel (Searle, 1997:58-59). 
 
The characteristics of the population data, and subsequent sample data used in this study, 
are the same.  All DoD missile systems are managed under the same legislation and 
regulations, and it is the attempt of this research to determine if these changes have 
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impacted cost growth by comparing pre-reform and post-reform periods.  Additionally, 
within each missile program there are numerous groups performing cost management and 
estimating tasks, including support contractors, financial management personnel, and 
engineers, all with varying degrees of experience and training.  Therefore, the assumption 
of independence can be established.  Despite all of the variables that support the 
assumption of independence in this data, it is important to acknowledge the possibility 
that the samples may not be independent; thereby, potentially skewing the analysis 
results. 
Random Sample 
A random sample is defined as one which “ensures that every subset of fixed size 
in the population has the same chance of being included in the sample” (McClave et al., 
2001:16).  Since this research contains the entire population of missile systems in the 
SAR database from 1991 to 2001, the extracted data cannot be truly random.  However, 
given the statistical limitations of working with “real” data and the complete utilization of 
existing population data, the random sample requirement is assumed.  It is important to 
note that failure to meet the random sample requirement may skew analysis results. 
Normality 
The normality requirement will be tested both subjectively and objectively.  The 
subjective analysis consists of generating normal probability plots, which provide a 
graphical display of the data.  A straight line would indicate the potential existence of a 
normal distribution, while a nonlinear configuration would indicate the contrary 
(D’Agosto and Stephens, 1986:35).  This graphical representation serves only as an 
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informal preliminary judgment of normality and should always be accompanied by a 
formal normality test (D’Agosto and Stephens, 1986:41, 405). 
The Shapiro-Wilks test for normality constitutes the formal objective test and is 
preferred over less accurate tests such as the chi square and Kolmogorov-Smimov tests.  
Overall, the Shapiro-Wilks test is probably the most powerful non-graphical test of 
normality (D’Agosto and Stephens, 1986:41, 406).  The null hypothesis for the Shapiro 
Wilks test is that the data is normally distributed, while the alternate hypothesis is that the 
data is not normally distributed (D’Agosto and Stephens, 1986:41, 368).  The resulting p-
value from this test indicates the significance of any normality violations and is identified 
by a p-value that is less than or equal to the established alpha level. 
Equality of Variance 
The method for testing homogeneity of variance is dependent on the normality of 
the populations being analyzed; assuming independence and random sample 
requirements are met.  If the populations are both normally distributed then the F-Test for 
equal population variances would be employed.  The F-Test uses the ratio of population 
variances as the test statistic to assess if there is equal variance between the populations 
(McClave et al., 2001:435-436).  If the F-Test reveals equality of variance and all other 
assumptions are met, the parametric small sample t-test using a pooled sample estimator 
of the variance can be used. 
If a population’s Shapiro Wilks test revels that the data is non-normally 
distributed, which past cost growth research has indicated (Christensen and Templin, 
2002:108), then the Levene Test for homogeneity of variance will be used because it is 
less sensitive to violations of normality (Neter et al.,1996:112).  While the assumption of 
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equality of variance is not required when performing the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank 
sum test, the results of the Levene Test for homogeneity of variance can provide a 
general description about the data’s consistency. 
Phase II Summary 
This section identified the Phase II research objective and detailed the 
methodology utilized to determine if acquisition reform initiatives have made an impact 
on missile system cost growth.  The hypothesis testing treatment methods were defined, 
and the assumptions necessary for appropriate model selection, either the parametric two 
sample t-test or nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test, was discussed. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter detailed the methodology utilized to conduct each phase of the 
analysis.  Phase I focused on generating ACGFs for each missile program for all relevant 
years in the research window.  Subsequently, Phase II utilized the adjusted cost growth 
factors from Phase I to test if current acquisition reform initiatives made any impact on 
missile program’s cost growth.  Results of these analyses are provided in Chapter IV. 
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IV.  Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis for each phase of the 
research.  An analytical summary of the statistical test results are presented as either 
tabular or graphical images for each individual phase. 
Phase I 
The purpose of Phase I was to calculate adjusted missile system cost growth 
factors from the 1991 to 2001 Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR), using a hybrid 
adjusted cost growth model.  The data population for this research contains all missile 
programs that reported SARs during 1991 to 2001.  The sample selected for Phase I 
includes only those programs with a reported Milestone II baseline.  A total of 21 missile 
systems and 135 reported SARs were identified for this treatment period.  The adjusted 
cost growth factors (ACGF) for each program are presented in Table 14. 
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Table 14.  Annual Adjusted Cost Growth Factors 
Program 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
AGM-65D (Maverick) 1.85 1.86
AGM-84A (Harpoon) 1.62
AGM-88 (HARM USN) 1.46 1.46 1.45
AGM-114 (Hellfire) 1.57 1.59 1.56
AGM-114K (Hellfire Longbow) 1.01 1.44 1.35 1.06 1.14 1.16 1.17 1.16 1.17 1.17 1.21
AIM-9X (Sidewinder) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
AIM-54C (Phoenix) 0.37
AIM-120 (AMRAAM) 1.55 1.84 1.77 1.80 1.80 1.77 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70
ATACMS P3I (BAT) 1.00 1.13 1.18 1.28 1.27 1.28 1.37 1.58 1.95 2.12 2.25
BLU-108 JSOW AIWS 1.00 1.03 0.99 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.06 1.07 1.07 1.27
BLU-108 JSOW Unitary 0.97 1.09 1.10 1.33 1.20 1.20 1.60
CBU-97B SFW 1.09 1.08 1.02 1.05 1.16 1.23 1.24 1.19
FGM-148A Javeline AAWS 1.14 1.40 1.78 1.62 1.65 1.72 1.79 1.98 2.05 2.15 2.11
JDAM 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.09 1.11 1.11 1.17
MIM-104 Patriot 1.08 1.08
MIM-104 Patriot PAC3 1.00 1.04 1.26 1.30 1.63 1.58 1.27 1.43
Navy Area TBMD 1.00 1.11 1.14 1.14 1.48
RIM-66M/67D (SM-2 MR/ER) 0.98 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.08 1.05 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.13
RGM-109 Tomahawk MMM 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.78
SADARM 155mm Projectile 1.02 1.04 1.15 1.35 1.46 1.47 1.62 1.71
SADARM 155mm Rocket 0.74 0.92 0.73
Annual Average 1.15 1.26 1.24 1.20 1.20 1.22 1.26 1.35 1.37 1.36 1.49
 
The sampling distribution of the data set in Table 14 is comprised of the 21 missile 
system ACGFs, which create the population distributions for the eleven annual means, 
and hence the random variable under study in Phase II. 
One of the research objectives of this thesis is to compare the 1993 RAND cost 
growth analysis results for missile systems, which covered the late 1960s to 1990 and 
averaged 17 percent, to that of missile systems for the current research treatment period 
of 1991 to 2001.  Averaging all current missile system ACGFs produced an overall 
average for the treatment period of 28 percent; which is 11 percentage points higher than 
the historical RAND results of 17 percent. 
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Phase II 
The objective of Phase II was to determine if current acquisition reform initiatives 
have impacted the mean annual ACGF for missile systems.  The mean annual ACGF for 
each year is depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Average Annual Adjusted Cost Growth Factors 
The objective in Phase II was accomplished by performing a hypothesis test 
between the mean ACGF of the pre-reform period (1 January to 31 December 1996) to 
the mean ACGF of the post-reform period (1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001).  Table 
15 provides statistics on the missile systems available from SARs during the treatment 
periods that meet all requirements listed for this research. 
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Table 15.  Sample Statistics 
Group Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
(1 Jan 91 - 31 Dec 96) (1 Jan 97 - 31 Dec 01)
# Programs 20 13
# SARS 76 59
Sample Mean 1.23 1.37
Sample Std Dev 0.04 0.08  
 
The pre-reform ACGF mean of 1.23 is less than the post-reform ACGF mean of 
1.37; however, the statistical significance of this difference must be determined with a 
hypothesis test.  In order to accurately assess whether a parametric or nonparametric 
hypothesis test is appropriate, the assumptions of normality and equality of variance are 
tested using a statistical software package, JMP 5.  The assumption test outputs and 
corresponding p-values are provided.  The assumptions of independence and randomness 
were assumed as stated in Chapter III, therefore no formal tests are conducted. 
Normality 
Normality of the six pre-reform means and five post-reform means was tested 
both subjectively and objectively.  The subjective test consisted of generating normal 
probability plots for both the pre-reform and post-reform samples as shown in Figure 5.  
Since the data points from each sample form a relatively straight line, it is likely that the 
samples are normal.  This is to be expected since the sampling distribution of 76 pre-
reform and 59 post reform ACGFs are large enough to approximate a normal distribution 
of the pre-reform and post-reform sample means. 
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Pre-Reform Normality Post-Reform Normality
 
Figure 5.  Normal Probability Plots 
The objective test consisted of using the Shapiro Wilks Test for Normality and the 
test results are displayed in Figure 6. 
 Shapiro-Wilk W Test
  0.972794
W
  0.9040
Prob<W
Goodness-of-Fit Test
                    
 Shapiro-Wilk W Test
  0.911866
W
  0.4806
Prob<W
Goodness-of-Fit Test
 
Figure 6.  Shapiro-Wilks Test Results 
The p-value in the pre-reform sample of 0.9040 and post-reform sample of 0.4806 
exceed the established alpha level of 0.05 and indicate that the pre-reform and post-
reform samples originate from normal distributions.  Since the parametric small sample t-
test assumption of normality is validated, the F-test for equal population variances is 
employed to check the equality of variance assumption. 
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Equality of Variance 
The F-test for equal population variances can be conducted on the sample data set 
since the assumptions that the two populations are normally distributed and randomly and 
independently selected from their populations, have been satisfied (McClave et al., 
2001:436).  The F-test compares the population variances by making inferences about the 
ratio of the sample variances.  An F-test for equality of variance was conducted using 
JMP 5.1.  The F-test results are displayed in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  JMP 5.1 F-Test Results 
Since the F test 2-sided p-value of 0.1632 exceeds the established alpha level of 
0.05, the equality of variance assumption is satisfied and the data appears stationary.  The 
parametric small sample t-test, with a pooled sample estimator of the variance, can now 
be conducted to compare the pre-reform and post-reform means. 
Hypothesis Test Results 
The small sample t-test is an inferential statistical test employed to evaluate 
whether the two independent samples represent two populations with different mean 
values (Sheskin, 2000:247).  The small sample t-test used in this research to determine if 
pre-reform and post-reform ACGF means are the equivalent, is a non-directional two-
tailed test.  If the test results are significant, one can conclude that there is a high 
 68
likelihood that the two sample means are different.  The small sample t-test JMP 5.1 
results are displayed in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  JMP 5.1 Small Sample T-Test Results 
Since the t-test p-value of 0.0082 is less than established alpha of 0.05, there is 
sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis.  Therefore, the t-test results provide 
statistical support, in general, to reject the null hypothesis that the pre-reform and post-
reform samples represent two populations with equal annual ACGF means.  Further 
analysis of the JMP 5.1 output reveals a 95 percent confidence interval that the true 
difference in population means falls within the lower bounds of -0.25172 and the upper 
bounds of -0.05837.  Since this range excludes zero, there is a 95 percent probability that 
the two populations actually have different means. 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the statistical analysis for each phase of the 
research.  Initially, the Phase I annual ACGF for each missile system were identified for 
years 1991 to 2001. The treatment period ACGF average of 28 percent was calculated 
and shown to be 11 percentage points higher than the 30-year historical average of 17 
percent reported by RAND. 
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Next, a Phase II hypothesis test was chosen to determine if the mean ACGF for 
pre-reform (1 January 1991 to 31 December 1996) missile systems was equal to the mean 
ACGF for post-reform (1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001) missile systems.  The 
parametric small sample t-test was chosen as the hypothesis test after the Shapiro-Wilks 
test for normality indicated that the sample distributions were normal and the F-test 
revealed equality of variance.  Finally, the Phase II small sample t-test hypothesis results 
were presented, identifying significant statistical disparity between the means of each 
reform period. 
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V.  Conclusion 
Review of Research Objectives 
This research focused on two main objectives.  First, using a hybrid adjusted cost 
growth model determine if missile programs incurred cost growth from 1991 to 2001 at a 
similar rate to missile system cost growth identified in the previous 30 years by RAND.  
Second, through statistical hypothesis testing identify if acquisition reform initiatives 
implemented during the research window made any impact on missile program cost 
growth. 
Discussion of Results 
The Phase I adjusted cost growth factor (ACGF) results revealed that from 1991 
to 2001 missile system programs have on average exceeded the 17 percent historical 
ACGF identified by RAND.  This result is apparent when averaging all of the annual 
ACGFs from Table 14.  Additionally, the results identified that 18 of 21 (85.71 percent) 
missile systems included in this analysis experienced cost growth from 1991 to 2001. 
The Phase II statistical assumptions of independence, random sampling, 
normality, and equality of variance were validated to determine the appropriate 
hypothesis test for this analysis.  While independence and random sampling were 
assumed, the normality and equality of variance assumptions passed the appropriate 
statistical tests, identifying the need for a parametric hypothesis test.  The small sample t-
test was chosen for this analysis because it is the appropriate statistical test for comparing 
two populations with independent sampling and small sample sizes. 
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The small sample t-test results provide statistical support, in general, to reject the 
null hypothesis that the pre-reform samples and the post-reform samples represent two 
populations with equal annual ACGF means.  This result reveals that average annual 
adjusted cost growth in the pre-reform and post-reform periods are not the same.  In fact, 
the average annual ACGF is only 1.23 before the 1996 treatment date, while the average 
annual ACGF increases to 1.37 after the treatment date.  This increase in average annual 
ACGF suggests that current acquisition reform initiatives have not reduced the amount of 
cost growth experienced by missile system programs.  Although this analysis does not 
suggest that acquisition reform initiatives have caused the increased average annual 
ACGFs, the data does reveal a distinct increase in missile system cost growth during this 
research period. 
 
Conclusions 
The Phase I results identified that adjusted cost growth existed in 18 of 21 missile 
programs.  These results effectively satisfied the initial research objective of determining 
if adjusted cost growth existed in missile systems during the research period and formed 
the ACGFs for the Phase II analysis.  The Phase I analysis revealed several complicating 
factors involved in performing cost growth calculations.  Initially, the data included in 
cost growth calculations are somewhat subjective, as one must carefully interpret the 
Selected Acquisition Report’s (SAR) qualitative and quantitative sections.  Proper data 
extraction from the SAR is perhaps best classified as an art rather than a science, as 
numerous organizations have developed different cost data from the same source 
documents.  Furthermore, there are several different methodologies available to calculate 
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cost growth.  Researchers must clearly determine how to adjust for inflation and whether 
or not to account for quantity adjustments, production learning curves or simply compute 
the raw data at face value.  Selecting the appropriate methodology for the research 
objective is crucial in generating accurate results.  Finally, the dynamic nature of using 
“real world” data poses several statistical limitations as new missile systems begin and 
existing systems terminate throughout the research period.  However, statistical 
limitations are common and generally accepted when dealing with “real world” data. 
The results of Phase II identified that adjusted cost growth in missile systems has 
increased despite numerous acquisition reform initiatives to curb such growth.  This 
result raises some concerns about the effectiveness of current acquisition reform 
strategies on weapon system cost growth.  As revealed in Chapter II, many of the same 
reform initiatives re-appear with each attempt to curb cost growth, even after historical 
cost growth studies revealed that cost growth within major defense acquisition programs 
continue to average around 20 percent.  Many of the themes that have persisted in both 
historical and current acquisition reform endeavors include: a push to eliminate 
bureaucracy, streamlining regulatory guidelines, implementing commercial practices, 
providing the end-user more flexibility, and organizational culture change.  While the 
majority of the Department of Defense, Congressional, and Presidential Administration’s 
acquisition reform efforts have targeted some form of management inefficiencies, the 
results of this and previous cost growth studies certainly leave room for debate as to 
whether this approach is appropriate for reducing cost growth. 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
During the course of this thesis, three potential areas for follow-on research arose.  
First, analyze recent cost growth for all weapon systems using SAR data.  Results from 
this analysis could be compared with RAND’s historical cost growth results to determine 
if, on a macro level, any improvements have occurred over time.  Additionally, testing for 
differences in the pre-reform and post-reform population means of all weapon systems 
may reveal that the missile system results in this thesis were simply an anomaly and 
acquisition reform initiatives have made cost growth improvements.  Second, identify the 
causes of cost growth at the program level and quantify the most severe cost growth 
drivers.  Due to the dynamic nature of weapon system acquisition, identifying cost 
drivers that universally apply to all programs may not provide a specific program 
manager with much insight.  However, research performed to identify and quantitatively 
rank the most significant program specific cost drivers would reveal where the greatest 
cost growth mitigation efforts should be focused.  Finally, develop a program specific 
cost growth model to facilitate cost growth management in the future.  Numerous 
researchers have designed generic cost growth prediction models applicable to all 
weapon systems; however, designing a cost growth prediction model for a specific 
program may provide more relevant results for the respective program manager.  A more 
specialized cost growth model for a single weapon system should effectively account for 
the nuances of that system and generate a more accurate cost growth forecast.  This 
improvement in cost growth forecasting accuracy would enable a program manager to 
devise a more appropriate scheme for mitigating cost growth. 
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Appendix A.  AGM-65G (Maverick) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1976 31078 271.35 2603.17 0.00 2874.52
1992 1976 31078 271.35 2603.17 0.00 2874.52
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 305.73 3462.28 0.00 3768.01 25514.00
1992 305.73 3410.04 0.00 3715.77 24914.00
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 859.11 629.29 -306.43 322.86 -1307.31 2166.42
1992 806.87 -42.27 -9.69 -51.96 -1359.27 2166.14
SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 17.42 0.72 3793.24 3423.14 2400.65
1992 17.42 0.72 3793.24 3381.01 2430.25
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 1.13 1.33 1.92 #DIV/0! 1.31 1.85
1992 1.13 1.31 1.93 #DIV/0! 1.29 1.86
Cost Growth Factors
Baseline Data
Current Data
Quantity Variance Data
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix B.  AGM-84A (Harpoon) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1973 2870 1089.03 2188.81 0.00 3277.85
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 1139.62 5253.99 1.17 6394.79 3653
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect Qty 
Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total  
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 3065.18 5.89 0.00 5.89 646.34 2418.84
SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 4.59 0.90 3926.74 4818.22 1971.30
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ PROC 
CGF MCON CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 1.05 2.40 1.90 #DIV/0! 1.95 1.62
Baseline Data
Quantity Variance Data
Learning Curve Analysis
Cost Growth Factors
Current Data
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Appendix C.  AGM-88 (HARM USN) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1978 6467 515.34 1679.98 0.00 2195.32
1992 1978 6467 515.34 1679.98 0.00 2195.32
1993 1978 6467 515.34 1679.98 0.00 2195.32
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 1057.51 5827.42 6.45 6891.38 9595
1992 1057.06 5834.61 6.24 6897.91 9595
1993 1056.61 5806.10 10.40 6873.12 9595
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 4147.44 -572.94 -155.30 -728.24 3567.77 579.67
1992 4154.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 3567.77 586.85
1993 4126.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 3567.77 558.35
SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 13.92 0.75 2264.16 2846.60 461.07
1992 13.92 0.75 2264.16 2846.60 466.78
1993 13.92 0.75 2264.16 2846.60 444.11
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 2.05 3.47 1.27 #DIV/0! 3.14 1.46
1992 2.05 3.47 1.28 #DIV/0! 3.14 1.46
1993 2.05 3.46 1.26 #DIV/0! 3.13 1.45
Cost Growth Factors
Baseline Data
Current Data
Quantity Variance Data
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix D.  AGM-114 (Hellfire) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1976 24600 634.67 874.38 0.00 1509.05
1992 1976 24600 634.67 874.38 0.00 1509.05
1993 1976 24600 634.67 874.38 0.00 1509.05
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 824.64 2122.40 0.00 2947.04 46175
1992 832.95 2097.45 0.00 2930.40 45007
1993 805.16 2070.74 0.00 2875.89 45659
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 1248.02 -22.89 12.03 -10.86 277.37 970.65
1992 1223.07 -30.53 -4.11 -34.64 242.73 980.34
1993 1196.36 15.85 -31.11 -15.26 227.47 968.89
SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 3.59 0.75 1361.08 1969.98 670.63
1992 3.59 0.75 1361.08 1940.57 687.59
1993 3.59 0.75 1361.08 1957.02 673.85
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 1.30 2.43 1.77 #DIV/0! 1.95 1.57
1992 1.31 2.40 1.79 #DIV/0! 1.94 1.59
1993 1.27 2.37 1.77 #DIV/0! 1.91 1.56
Learning Curve Analysis
Cost Growth Factors
Baseline Data
Current Data
Quantity Variance Data
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Appendix E.  AGM-114K (Hellfire Longbow) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1990 10896 355.81 1553.67 0.00 1909.48
1992 1990 10896 355.81 1553.67 0.00 1909.48
1993 1990 10896 355.81 1553.67 0.00 1909.48
1994 1990 10896 355.81 1553.67 0.00 1909.48
1995 1990 10896 355.81 1553.67 0.00 1909.48
1996 1990 10896 355.81 1553.67 0.00 1909.48
1997 1990 10896 355.81 1553.67 0.00 1909.48
1998 1990 10896 355.81 1553.67 0.00 1909.48
1999 1990 10896 355.81 1553.67 0.00 1909.48
2000 1990 10896 355.81 1553.67 0.00 1909.48
2001 1990 10896 355.81 1553.67 0.00 1909.48
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 355.34 1581.40 0.00 1936.74 10896.00
1992 420.08 2768.80 0.00 3188.88 13311.00
1993 421.13 2576.78 0.00 2997.91 13311.00
1994 419.73 1960.37 0.00 2380.10 13311.00
1995 488.58 2035.64 0.00 2524.22 13260.00
1996 487.42 2045.66 0.00 2533.07 13003.00
1997 481.39 2050.61 0.00 2532.00 12905.00
1998 458.02 2056.83 0.00 2514.86 12905.00
1999 457.92 2079.82 0.00 2537.74 12905.00
2000 457.92 2079.82 0.00 2537.74 12905.00
2001 478.64 2140.97 0.00 2619.62 12905.00
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 27.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.73
1992 1215.14 332.06 8.43 340.50 340.50 874.64
1993 1023.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 340.50 682.61
1994 406.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 340.50 66.20
1995 481.97 -5.20 -4.97 -10.17 330.33 151.64
1996 491.99 -26.69 -1.27 -27.96 302.37 189.62
1997 496.94 -10.28 -9.36 -19.64 282.73 214.22
1998 503.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 282.73 220.44
1999 526.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 282.73 243.42
2000 526.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 282.73 243.42
2001 587.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 282.73 304.58
Baseline Data
Current Data
Quantity Variance Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 5.83 0.77 1833.95 1833.95 27.73
1992 5.83 0.77 1833.95 2075.79 772.74
1993 5.83 0.77 1833.95 2075.79 603.09
1994 5.83 0.77 1833.95 2075.79 58.49
1995 5.83 0.77 1833.95 2070.87 134.29
1996 5.83 0.77 1833.95 2045.94 169.97
1997 5.83 0.77 1833.95 2036.38 192.92
1998 5.83 0.77 1833.95 2036.38 198.52
1999 5.83 0.77 1833.95 2036.38 219.23
2000 5.83 0.77 1833.95 2036.38 219.23
2001 5.83 0.77 1833.95 2036.38 274.30
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 1.00 1.02 1.02 #DIV/0! 1.01 1.01
1992 1.18 1.78 1.50 #DIV/0! 1.67 1.44
1993 1.18 1.66 1.39 #DIV/0! 1.57 1.35
1994 1.18 1.26 1.04 #DIV/0! 1.25 1.06
1995 1.37 1.31 1.09 #DIV/0! 1.32 1.14
1996 1.37 1.32 1.11 #DIV/0! 1.33 1.16
1997 1.35 1.32 1.12 #DIV/0! 1.33 1.17
1998 1.29 1.32 1.13 #DIV/0! 1.32 1.16
1999 1.29 1.34 1.14 #DIV/0! 1.33 1.17
2000 1.29 1.34 1.14 #DIV/0! 1.33 1.17
2001 1.35 1.38 1.18 #DIV/0! 1.37 1.21
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix F.  AIM-9X (Sidewinder) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1994 1996 0 553.71 0.00 0.00 553.71
1995 1996 0 553.71 0.00 0.00 553.71
1996 1996 10000 553.71 2014.28 0.00 2567.99
1997 1996 10000 553.71 2014.28 0.00 2567.99
1998 1996 10000 553.71 2014.28 0.00 2567.99
1999 1996 10000 553.71 2014.28 0.00 2567.99
2000 1996 10000 553.71 2014.28 0.00 2567.99
2001 1996 10000 553.71 2014.28 0.00 2567.99
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1994 658.71 0.00 0.00 658.71 0
1995 667.62 0.00 0.00 667.62 0
1996 553.71 2014.28 0.00 2567.99 10000
1997 542.36 2159.98 0.00 2702.34 10000
1998 558.09 2082.75 0.00 2640.84 10080
1999 564.24 1869.41 0.00 2433.65 10097
2000 564.24 1869.41 0.00 2433.65 10097
2001 570.59 1956.12 0.00 2526.72 10097
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1994 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1996 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1998 11.78 11.78 2.81 14.59 14.59 -2.81
1999 2.50 2.50 0.73 3.23 17.82 -15.32
2000 2.50 2.50 0.73 3.23 21.05 -18.55
2001 -0.83 -0.83 0.00 0.00 21.05 -21.89
Quantity Variance Data
Baseline Data
Current Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1994 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1996 0.73 0.90 1823.02 1823.02 0.00
1997 0.73 0.90 1823.02 1823.02 0.00
1998 0.73 0.90 1823.02 1835.40 -2.79
1999 0.73 0.90 1823.02 1838.02 -15.20
2000 0.73 0.90 1823.02 1838.02 -18.40
2001 0.73 0.90 1823.02 1838.02 -21.71
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1994 1.19 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 1.19 1.19
1995 1.21 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 1.21 1.21
1996 1.00 1.00 1.00 #DIV/0! 1.00 1.00
1997 0.98 1.07 1.00 #DIV/0! 1.05 1.00
1998 1.01 1.03 1.00 #DIV/0! 1.03 1.00
1999 1.02 0.93 0.99 #DIV/0! 0.95 1.00
2000 1.02 0.93 0.99 #DIV/0! 0.95 1.00
2001 1.03 0.97 0.99 #DIV/0! 0.98 1.00
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix G.  AIM-54C (Phoenix) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1976 2885 901.90 3800.46 2.49 4704.84
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 300.76 3314.29 2.94 3617.99 2483
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 -486.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 1621.92 -2108.08
SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 10.73 0.84 4003.52 3580.99 -2356.82
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 0.33 0.87 0.38 1.18 0.77 0.37
Quantity Variance Data
Baseline Data
Learning Curve Analysis
Current Data
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Appendix H.  AIM-120 (AMRAAM) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1982 24335 1636.22 9103.01 0.00 10739.23
1992 1982 24335 1636.22 9103.01 0.00 10739.23
1993 1982 24335 1636.22 9103.01 0.00 10739.23
1994 1982 24335 1636.22 9103.01 0.00 10739.23
1995 1982 24335 1636.22 9103.01 0.00 10739.23
1996 1982 24335 1636.22 9103.01 0.00 10739.23
1997 1982 24335 1636.22 9103.01 0.00 10739.23
1998 1982 24335 1636.22 9103.01 0.00 10739.23
1999 1982 24335 1636.22 9103.01 0.00 10739.23
2000 1982 24335 1636.22 9103.01 0.00 10739.23
2001 1982 24335 1636.22 9103.01 0.00 10739.23
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 1917.68 10888.69 0.00 12806.37 15450
1992 2406.35 11713.62 0.00 14119.97 13038
1993 2383.18 11111.05 0.00 13494.22 13038
1994 2449.49 10641.78 0.00 13091.27 12018
1995 2464.10 9907.93 0.00 12372.03 11019
1996 2449.95 9638.50 0.00 12088.45 10917
1997 2434.77 9152.96 0.00 11587.73 10917
1998 2508.62 9093.99 0.00 11602.61 10917
1999 2509.53 9086.99 0.00 11596.52 10917
2000 2509.53 9086.99 0.00 11596.52 10917
2001 2507.13 9123.59 0.00 11630.72 10917
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 1785.68 0.00 12.79 12.79 -2646.55 4432.23
1992 2610.62 -1034.34 330.55 -703.80 -3350.34 5960.96
1993 2008.04 0.00 -43.83 -43.83 -3394.18 5402.22
1994 1538.77 -432.33 -25.64 -457.98 -3852.15 5390.92
1995 804.92 -710.12 232.38 -477.75 -4329.90 5134.82
1996 535.49 -43.15 5.08 -38.07 -4367.97 4903.46
1997 49.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4367.97 4417.92
1998 -9.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4367.97 4358.95
1999 -16.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4367.97 4351.95
2000 -16.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4367.97 4351.95
2001 20.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4367.97 4388.55
Quantity Variance Data
Current Data
Baseline Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 71.27 0.72 13773.66 10869.57 5616.42
1992 71.27 0.72 13773.66 9949.24 8252.32
1993 71.27 0.72 13773.66 9949.24 7478.80
1994 71.27 0.72 13773.66 9535.64 7786.86
1995 71.27 0.72 13773.66 9113.92 7760.14
1996 71.27 0.72 13773.66 9069.85 7446.50
1997 71.27 0.72 13773.66 9069.85 6709.14
1998 71.27 0.72 13773.66 9069.85 6619.59
1999 71.27 0.72 13773.66 9069.85 6608.96
2000 71.27 0.72 13773.66 9069.85 6608.96
2001 71.27 0.72 13773.66 9069.85 6664.54
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 1.17 1.20 1.62 #DIV/0! 1.19 1.55
1992 1.47 1.29 1.91 #DIV/0! 1.31 1.84
1993 1.46 1.22 1.82 #DIV/0! 1.26 1.77
1994 1.50 1.17 1.86 #DIV/0! 1.22 1.80
1995 1.51 1.09 1.85 #DIV/0! 1.15 1.80
1996 1.50 1.06 1.82 #DIV/0! 1.13 1.77
1997 1.49 1.01 1.74 #DIV/0! 1.08 1.70
1998 1.53 1.00 1.73 #DIV/0! 1.08 1.70
1999 1.53 1.00 1.73 #DIV/0! 1.08 1.70
2000 1.53 1.00 1.73 #DIV/0! 1.08 1.70
2001 1.53 1.00 1.73 #DIV/0! 1.08 1.70
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix I.  ATACMS P3I (BAT) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1991 30993 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39
1992 1991 30993 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39
1993 1991 30993 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39
1994 1991 30993 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39
1995 1991 30993 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39
1996 1991 30993 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39
1997 1991 30993 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39
1998 1991 30993 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39
1999 1991 30993 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39
2000 1991 30993 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39
2001 1991 30993 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 823.85 1796.53 0.00 2620.39 30993
1992 1162.89 1310.46 0.00 2473.35 18154
1993 1343.15 1398.50 0.00 2741.64 20220
1994 1376.92 1562.91 0.00 2939.83 20226
1995 1365.54 1537.95 0.00 2903.50 19902
1996 1424.65 1512.31 0.00 2936.96 19871
1997 1470.62 1636.05 0.00 3106.67 19700
1998 1552.25 1956.79 0.00 3509.03 19554
1999 1567.49 2164.99 0.00 3732.48 15707
2000 1567.49 2164.99 0.00 3732.48 15707
2001 1967.98 2196.53 0.00 4164.52 16089
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1992 -486.08 -539.69 53.61 -486.08 -486.08 0.00
1993 -398.04 93.59 29.46 123.05 -363.03 -35.01
1994 -233.62 0.23 0.00 0.23 -362.80 129.17
1995 -258.58 -14.67 -4.04 -18.72 -381.51 122.93
1996 -284.23 -1.39 -0.35 -1.73 -383.25 99.02
1997 -160.49 -7.63 -1.85 -9.47 -392.72 232.24
1998 160.25 -7.39 -2.54 -9.94 -402.66 562.91
1999 368.46 -178.86 -86.08 -264.93 -667.59 1036.05
2000 368.46 -178.86 -86.08 -264.94 -932.53 1300.99
2001 400.00 18.14 18.14 36.28 -896.25 1296.25
Baseline Data
Current Data
Quantity Variance Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 1.46 0.85 3952.67 3952.67 0.00
1992 1.46 0.85 3952.67 2626.75 0.00
1993 1.46 0.85 3952.67 2852.21 -48.52
1994 1.46 0.85 3952.67 2852.85 178.97
1995 1.46 0.85 3952.67 2817.87 172.44
1996 1.46 0.85 3952.67 2814.52 139.06
1997 1.46 0.85 3952.67 2796.00 328.31
1998 1.46 0.85 3952.67 2780.15 800.32
1999 1.46 0.85 3952.67 2351.69 1741.37
2000 1.46 0.85 3952.67 2351.69 2186.68
2001 1.46 0.85 3952.67 2395.26 2139.08
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 1.00 1.00 1.00 #DIV/0! 1.00 1.00
1992 1.41 0.73 1.00 #DIV/0! 0.94 1.13
1993 1.63 0.78 0.97 #DIV/0! 1.05 1.18
1994 1.67 0.87 1.10 #DIV/0! 1.12 1.28
1995 1.66 0.86 1.10 #DIV/0! 1.11 1.27
1996 1.73 0.84 1.08 #DIV/0! 1.12 1.28
1997 1.79 0.91 1.18 #DIV/0! 1.19 1.37
1998 1.88 1.09 1.45 #DIV/0! 1.34 1.58
1999 1.90 1.21 1.97 #DIV/0! 1.42 1.95
2000 1.90 1.21 2.22 #DIV/0! 1.42 2.12
2001 2.39 1.22 2.19 #DIV/0! 1.59 2.25
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix J.  BLU-108 JSOW AIWSACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1992 1992 8800 412.96 1833.85 26.19 2273.00
1993 1992 8800 412.96 1833.85 26.19 2273.00
1994 1992 8800 412.96 1833.85 26.19 2273.00
1995 1992 8800 412.96 1833.85 26.19 2273.00
1996 1992 8800 412.96 1833.85 26.19 2273.00
1997 1992 8800 412.96 1833.85 26.19 2273.00
1998 1992 8800 412.96 1833.85 26.19 2273.00
1999 1992 8800 412.96 1833.85 26.19 2273.00
2000 1992 8800 412.96 1833.85 26.19 2273.00
2001 1992 8800 412.96 1833.85 26.19 2273.00
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1992 412.96 1833.85 25.91 2272.72 8800
1993 441.28 1758.26 13.91 2213.45 8800
1994 448.33 2161.28 14.14 2623.76 11800
1995 676.51 3582.84 14.86 4274.21 16000
1996 684.90 3536.01 0.00 4220.91 16000
1997 685.02 3546.23 0.00 4231.26 16000
1998 673.47 3513.31 0.00 4186.79 16124
1999 682.59 3548.37 0.00 4230.96 16114
2000 682.59 3548.37 0.00 4230.96 16114
2001 685.51 4240.19 0.00 4925.70 16114
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1992 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1993 -75.59 0.00 -120.04 -120.04 -120.04 44.45
1994 327.43 485.50 21.39 506.89 386.86 -59.42
1995 1748.99 660.33 772.40 1432.73 1819.59 -70.60
1996 1702.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 1819.59 -117.42
1997 1712.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 1819.59 -107.20
1998 1679.46 15.69 4.64 20.32 1839.91 -160.45
1999 1714.52 -2.02 0.00 -2.02 1837.89 -123.37
2000 1714.52 -2.02 0.00 -2.02 1835.87 -121.35
2001 2406.35 -26.62 0.00 -26.62 1809.25 597.10
Quantity Variance Data
Current Data
Baseline Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1992 2.31 0.86 2754.46 2754.46 0.00
1993 2.31 0.86 2754.46 2754.46 44.45
1994 2.31 0.86 2754.46 3462.35 -47.28
1995 2.31 0.86 2754.46 4390.14 -44.29
1996 2.31 0.86 2754.46 4390.14 -73.67
1997 2.31 0.86 2754.46 4390.14 -67.26
1998 2.31 0.86 2754.46 4416.65 -100.06
1999 2.31 0.86 2754.46 4414.51 -76.97
2000 2.31 0.86 2754.46 4414.51 -75.71
2001 2.31 0.86 2754.46 4414.51 372.56
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1992 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
1993 1.07 0.96 1.02 0.53 0.97 1.03
1994 1.09 1.18 0.97 0.54 1.15 0.99
1995 1.64 1.95 0.98 0.57 1.88 1.09
1996 1.66 1.93 0.96 0.00 1.86 1.08
1997 1.66 1.93 0.96 0.00 1.86 1.08
1998 1.63 1.92 0.95 0.00 1.84 1.06
1999 1.65 1.93 0.96 0.00 1.86 1.07
2000 1.65 1.93 0.96 0.00 1.86 1.07
2001 1.66 2.31 1.20 0.00 2.17 1.27
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix K.  BLU-108 JSOW Unitary ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1995 1995 7800 315.22 3848.23 0.00 4163.45
1996 1995 7800 315.22 3848.23 0.00 4163.45
1997 1995 7800 315.22 3848.23 0.00 4163.45
1998 1995 7800 315.22 3848.23 0.00 4163.45
1999 1995 7800 315.22 3848.23 0.00 4163.45
2000 1995 7800 315.22 3848.23 0.00 4163.45
2001 1995 7800 315.22 3848.23 0.00 4163.45
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1995 315.22 3848.23 0.00 4163.45 7800
1996 326.77 3123.96 0.00 3450.73 7800
1997 337.35 3113.98 0.00 3451.32 7800
1998 256.99 1657.24 0.00 1914.23 7800
1999 261.37 726.88 0.00 988.25 3000
2000 261.37 726.88 0.00 988.25 3000
2001 299.54 765.87 0.00 1065.40 3000
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1995 0.00 0.00 112.92 112.92 112.92 -112.92
1996 0.00 0.00 -488.77 -488.77 -375.85 375.85
1997 0.00 0.00 -7.07 -7.07 -382.92 382.92
1998 0.00 0.00 -1031.30 -1031.30 -1414.22 1414.22
1999 -929.40 0.00 -0.67 -0.67 -1414.89 485.49
2000 -929.40 0.00 -0.67 -0.67 -1415.56 486.16
2001 0.24 0.00 31.80 31.80 -1383.76 1384.00
Baseline Data
Current Data
Quantity Variance Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1995 12.22 0.77 3402.94 3402.94 -112.92
1996 12.22 0.77 3402.94 3402.94 375.85
1997 12.22 0.77 3402.94 3402.94 382.92
1998 12.22 0.77 3402.94 3402.94 1414.22
1999 12.22 0.77 3402.94 1867.26 884.77
2000 12.22 0.77 3402.94 1867.26 885.99
2001 12.22 0.77 3402.94 1867.26 2522.24
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1995 1.00 1.00 0.97 #DIV/0! 1.00 0.97
1996 1.04 0.81 1.10 #DIV/0! 0.83 1.09
1997 1.07 0.81 1.10 #DIV/0! 0.83 1.10
1998 0.82 0.43 1.37 #DIV/0! 0.46 1.33
1999 0.83 0.19 1.23 #DIV/0! 0.24 1.20
2000 0.83 0.19 1.23 #DIV/0! 0.24 1.20
2001 0.95 0.20 1.66 #DIV/0! 0.26 1.60
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
 91
Appendix L.  CBU-97B SFW ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1985 14000 167.25 2241.25 0.00 2408.50
1992 1985 14000 167.25 2241.25 0.00 2408.50
1993 1985 14000 167.25 2241.25 0.00 2408.50
1994 1985 14000 167.25 2241.25 0.00 2408.50
1995 1985 14000 167.25 2241.25 0.00 2408.50
1996 1985 14000 167.25 2241.25 0.00 2408.50
1997 1985 14000 167.25 2241.25 0.00 2408.50
1998 1985 14000 167.25 2241.25 0.00 2408.50
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 266.29 2125.10 0.00 2391.39 10000
1992 275.68 1322.01 0.00 1597.69 5000
1993 285.69 1234.95 0.00 1520.63 5000
1994 277.31 1284.99 0.00 1562.30 5000
1995 286.50 1420.26 0.00 1706.76 5000
1996 325.71 1497.56 0.00 1823.27 5000
1997 323.05 1505.90 0.00 1828.95 5000
1998 337.55 1386.49 0.00 1724.05 4837
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC$ 
Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 -116.15 -531.53 -4.07 -535.60 -203.62 87.47
1992 -919.24 -720.50 -39.26 -759.76 -963.38 44.14
1993 -1006.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 -963.38 -42.92
1994 -956.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 -963.38 7.12
1995 -820.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 -963.38 142.39
1996 -743.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 -963.38 219.69
1997 -735.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 -963.38 228.03
1998 -854.76 -37.84 -6.92 -44.75 -1008.13 153.37
Quantity Variance Data
Current Data
Baseline Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 8.33 0.75 2167.76 1781.87 106.41
1992 8.33 0.75 2167.76 1189.86 80.41
1993 8.33 0.75 2167.76 1189.86 -78.20
1994 8.33 0.75 2167.76 1189.86 12.97
1995 8.33 0.75 2167.76 1189.86 259.41
1996 8.33 0.75 2167.76 1189.86 400.24
1997 8.33 0.75 2167.76 1189.86 415.44
1998 8.33 0.75 2167.76 1167.10 284.87
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 1.59 0.95 1.05 #DIV/0! 0.99 1.09
1992 1.65 0.59 1.04 #DIV/0! 0.66 1.08
1993 1.71 0.55 0.97 #DIV/0! 0.63 1.02
1994 1.66 0.57 1.01 #DIV/0! 0.65 1.05
1995 1.71 0.63 1.12 #DIV/0! 0.71 1.16
1996 1.95 0.67 1.18 #DIV/0! 0.76 1.23
1997 1.93 0.67 1.19 #DIV/0! 0.76 1.24
1998 2.02 0.62 1.13 #DIV/0! 0.72 1.19
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix M.  FGM-148A (Javeline) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1989 70550 589.11 3441.76 0.00 4030.87
1992 1989 70550 589.11 3441.76 0.00 4030.87
1993 1989 70550 589.11 3441.76 0.00 4030.87
1994 1989 70550 589.11 3441.76 0.00 4030.87
1995 1989 70550 589.11 3441.76 0.00 4030.87
1996 1989 70550 589.11 3441.76 0.00 4030.87
1997 1989 70550 589.11 3441.76 0.00 4030.87
1998 1989 70550 589.11 3441.76 0.00 4030.87
1999 1989 70550 589.11 3441.76 0.00 4030.87
2000 1989 70550 589.11 3441.76 0.00 4030.87
2001 1989 70550 589.11 3441.76 0.00 4030.87
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 841.24 3740.91 0.00 4582.14 70550
1992 859.23 4576.78 0.00 5436.00 66485
1993 869.80 3581.29 0.00 4451.10 33611
1994 871.14 2792.13 0.00 3663.27 31264
1995 872.36 2847.52 0.00 3719.87 31269
1996 894.85 2845.26 0.00 3740.10 28967
1997 905.28 3028.97 0.00 3934.26 28453
1998 914.56 3316.83 0.00 4231.39 26956
1999 907.89 3046.38 0.00 3954.27 22358
2000 907.89 3046.38 0.00 3954.27 22358
2001 911.43 3391.25 0.00 4302.68 25794
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 299.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 299.14
1992 1135.01 -146.78 0.00 -146.78 -146.78 1281.79
1993 139.53 -972.90 -593.65 -1566.56 -1713.33 1852.86
1994 -649.63 -89.73 -230.09 -319.82 -2033.16 1383.53
1995 -594.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2033.16 1438.91
1996 -596.51 -85.45 -16.88 -102.33 -2135.49 1538.98
1997 -412.79 8.23 40.54 48.78 -2086.71 1673.92
1998 -124.93 -89.94 0.00 -89.94 -2176.66 2051.72
1999 -395.39 -292.13 87.75 -204.38 -2381.03 1985.65
2000 -395.39 -292.13 87.75 -204.38 -2585.41 2190.02
2001 -50.52 197.92 36.37 234.29 -2351.12 2300.60
Current Data
Baseline Data
Quantity Variance Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 3.18 0.75 2269.32 2269.32 299.14
1992 3.18 0.75 2269.32 2191.43 1327.35
1993 3.18 0.75 2269.32 1466.86 2866.49
1994 3.18 0.75 2269.32 1405.69 2233.55
1995 3.18 0.75 2269.32 1405.82 2322.74
1996 3.18 0.75 2269.32 1343.95 2598.63
1997 3.18 0.75 2269.32 1329.87 2856.42
1998 3.18 0.75 2269.32 1288.24 3614.26
1999 3.18 0.75 2269.32 1153.97 3904.83
2000 3.18 0.75 2269.32 1153.97 4306.74
2001 3.18 0.75 2269.32 1255.26 4159.15
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 1.43 1.09 1.09 #DIV/0! 1.14 1.14
1992 1.46 1.33 1.39 #DIV/0! 1.35 1.40
1993 1.48 1.04 1.83 #DIV/0! 1.10 1.78
1994 1.48 0.81 1.65 #DIV/0! 0.91 1.62
1995 1.48 0.83 1.67 #DIV/0! 0.92 1.65
1996 1.52 0.83 1.76 #DIV/0! 0.93 1.72
1997 1.54 0.88 1.83 #DIV/0! 0.98 1.79
1998 1.55 0.96 2.05 #DIV/0! 1.05 1.98
1999 1.54 0.89 2.13 #DIV/0! 0.98 2.05
2000 1.54 0.89 2.25 #DIV/0! 0.98 2.15
2001 1.55 0.99 2.21 #DIV/0! 1.07 2.11
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix N. JDAM ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1995 1995 87496 524.24 1724.54 0.00 2248.78
1996 1995 87496 524.24 1724.54 0.00 2248.78
1997 1995 87496 524.24 1724.54 0.00 2248.78
1998 1995 87496 524.24 1724.54 0.00 2248.78
1999 1995 87496 524.24 1724.54 0.00 2248.78
2000 1995 87496 524.24 1724.54 0.00 2248.78
2001 1995 87496 524.24 1724.54 0.00 2248.78
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1995 524.24 1724.54 0.00 2248.78 87496
1996 480.18 1747.22 0.00 2227.40 87496
1997 474.80 1807.77 0.00 2282.56 87496
1998 611.16 1831.84 0.00 2442.99 87496
1999 605.34 1895.27 0.00 2500.61 87496
2000 605.34 1895.27 0.00 2500.61 87496
2001 747.52 2884.79 0.00 3632.31 136749
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1995 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1996 22.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.68
1997 83.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 83.23
1998 107.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 107.30
1999 170.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 170.73
2000 170.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 170.73
2001 1160.25 1024.14 -123.41 900.73 900.73 259.52
Quantity Variance Data
Current Data
Baseline Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1995 0.04 0.97 1900.78 1900.78 0.00
1996 0.04 0.97 1900.78 1900.78 22.68
1997 0.04 0.97 1900.78 1900.78 83.23
1998 0.04 0.97 1900.78 1900.78 107.30
1999 0.04 0.97 1900.78 1900.78 170.73
2000 0.04 0.97 1900.78 1900.78 170.73
2001 0.04 0.97 1900.78 2915.31 169.20
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1995 1.00 1.00 1.00 #DIV/0! 1.00 1.00
1996 0.92 1.01 1.01 #DIV/0! 0.99 0.99
1997 0.91 1.05 1.05 #DIV/0! 1.02 1.02
1998 1.17 1.06 1.06 #DIV/0! 1.09 1.09
1999 1.15 1.10 1.10 #DIV/0! 1.11 1.11
2000 1.15 1.10 1.10 #DIV/0! 1.11 1.11
2001 1.43 1.67 1.10 #DIV/0! 1.62 1.17
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix O.  MIM-104 (Patriot) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1976 117 5063.03 7607.20 27.21 12697.44
1992 1976 117 5063.03 7607.20 27.21 12697.44
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 5694.39 11953.52 206.34 17854.26 6475
1992 5694.39 11963.64 206.34 17864.37 6915
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 4346.33 296.48 0.00 296.48 1913.42 2432.91
1992 4356.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1913.42 2443.03
SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 61.21 0.76 1134.83 13295.12 207.67
1992 61.21 0.76 1134.83 13842.01 200.29
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 1.12 1.57 1.03 7.58 1.41 1.08
1992 1.12 1.57 1.03 7.58 1.41 1.08
Quantity Variance Data
Baseline Data
Current Data
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix P.  MIM-104 (Patriot PAC-3) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1994 1994 1200 2403.50 3316.47 0.00 5719.97
1995 1994 1200 2403.50 3316.47 0.00 5719.97
1996 1994 1200 2403.50 3316.47 0.00 5719.97
1997 1994 1200 2403.50 3316.47 0.00 5719.97
1998 1994 1200 2403.50 3316.47 0.00 5719.97
1999 1994 1200 2403.50 3316.47 0.00 5719.97
2000 1994 1200 2403.50 3316.47 0.00 5719.97
2001 1994 1200 2403.50 3316.47 0.00 5719.97
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1994 2403.50 3316.47 0.00 5719.97 1200
1995 3067.80 2859.42 0.00 5927.22 1200
1996 3128.49 4083.74 0.00 7212.23 1200
1997 3237.10 4190.54 0.00 7427.64 1200
1998 3538.31 4181.62 0.00 7719.93 560
1999 3646.13 6014.02 0.00 9660.15 1048
2000 3646.13 6014.02 0.00 9660.15 1048
2001 3917.59 7188.89 0.00 11106.47 1199
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1994 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1995 -457.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -457.05
1996 767.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 767.27
1997 874.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 874.08
1998 865.15 -917.41 0.00 -917.41 -917.41 1782.56
1999 2697.55 1370.51 292.38 1662.89 745.48 1952.08
2000 2697.55 1370.51 292.38 1662.89 2408.36 289.19
2001 3872.42 376.37 165.56 541.93 2950.29 922.13
Baseline Data
Current Data
Quantity Variance Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1994 369.48 0.67 6998.56 6998.56 0.00
1995 369.48 0.67 6998.56 6998.56 -457.05
1996 369.48 0.67 6998.56 6998.56 767.27
1997 369.48 0.67 6998.56 6998.56 874.08
1998 369.48 0.67 6998.56 5101.46 2445.45
1999 369.48 0.67 6998.56 6616.18 2064.90
2000 369.48 0.67 6998.56 6616.18 305.91
2001 369.48 0.67 6998.56 6996.14 922.44
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1994 1.00 1.00 1.00 #DIV/0! 1.00 1.00
1995 1.28 0.86 0.86 #DIV/0! 1.04 1.04
1996 1.30 1.23 1.23 #DIV/0! 1.26 1.26
1997 1.35 1.26 1.26 #DIV/0! 1.30 1.30
1998 1.47 1.26 1.74 #DIV/0! 1.35 1.63
1999 1.52 1.81 1.62 #DIV/0! 1.69 1.58
2000 1.52 1.81 1.09 #DIV/0! 1.69 1.27
2001 1.63 2.17 1.28 #DIV/0! 1.94 1.43
Learning Curve Analysis
Cost Growth Factors
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Appendix Q.  Navy Area TBMD ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1997 1997 1500 2068.85 3459.43 0.00 5528.28
1998 1997 1500 2068.85 3459.43 0.00 5528.28
1999 1997 1500 2068.85 3459.43 0.00 5528.28
2000 1997 1500 2068.85 3459.43 0.00 5528.28
2001 1997 1500 2068.85 3459.43 0.00 5528.28
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1997 2068.85 3459.43 0.00 5528.28 1500
1998 2227.30 3885.80 0.00 6113.09 1500
1999 2510.16 3800.20 0.00 6310.35 1500
2000 2510.16 3800.20 0.00 6310.35 1500
2001 3170.20 5021.21 0.00 8191.41 1500
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1997 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1998 426.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 426.37
1999 340.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 340.77
2000 340.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 340.77
2001 1561.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1561.78
Quantity Variance Data
Current Data
Baseline Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1997 49.43 0.75 3375.54 3375.54 0.00
1998 49.43 0.75 3375.54 3375.54 426.37
1999 49.43 0.75 3375.54 3375.54 340.77
2000 49.43 0.75 3375.54 3375.54 340.77
2001 49.43 0.75 3375.54 3375.54 1561.78
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1997 1.00 1.00 1.00 #DIV/0! 1.00 1.00
1998 1.08 1.12 1.12 #DIV/0! 1.11 1.11
1999 1.21 1.10 1.10 #DIV/0! 1.14 1.14
2000 1.21 1.10 1.10 #DIV/0! 1.14 1.14
2001 1.53 1.45 1.45 #DIV/0! 1.48 1.48
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix R.  RGM-109 (Tomahawk MMM) ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1977 1082 2944.05 11480.26 0.68 14424.99
1992 1977 1082 2944.05 11480.26 0.68 14424.99
1993 1977 1082 2944.05 11480.26 0.68 14424.99
1994 1977 1082 2944.05 11480.26 0.68 14424.99
1995 1977 1082 2944.05 11480.26 0.68 14424.99
1996 1977 1082 2944.05 11480.26 0.68 14424.99
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 3224.3 9676.64 40.89 12941.82 4048.00
1992 3784.3 10331.70 74.79 14190.75 4568.00
1993 3933.3 10271.64 72.53 14277.46 4568.00
1994 3288.3 9855.85 72.53 13216.67 4365.00
1995 3281.7 9776.91 82.02 13140.62 4301.00
1996 3283.9 9874.48 79.08 13237.46 4301.00
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 -1803.63 218.19 40.94 259.13 8424.12 -10227.75
1992 -1148.57 547.68 39.96 587.64 9011.77 -10160.33
1993 -1208.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 9011.77 -10220.40
1994 -1624.42 -201.77 -129.44 -331.21 8680.56 -10304.98
1995 -1703.36 -65.46 30.40 -35.06 8645.50 -10348.86
1996 -1605.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 8645.50 -10251.29
Quantity Variance Data
Current Data
Baseline Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 16.31 0.84 3149.20 8508.49 -3785.54
1992 16.31 0.84 3149.20 9319.44 -3433.35
1993 16.31 0.84 3149.20 9319.44 -3453.65
1994 16.31 0.84 3149.20 9005.71 -3603.53
1995 16.31 0.84 3149.20 8906.07 -3659.37
1996 16.31 0.84 3149.20 8906.07 -3624.87
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 1.10 0.84 0.67 60.33 0.90 0.76
1992 1.29 0.90 0.70 110.33 0.98 0.83
1993 1.34 0.89 0.70 107.00 0.99 0.83
1994 1.12 0.86 0.69 107.00 0.92 0.78
1995 1.11 0.85 0.68 121.00 0.91 0.78
1996 1.12 0.86 0.68 116.67 0.92 0.78
Learning Curve Analysis
Cost Growth Factors
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Appendix S.  RIM-662/67D ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1983 10778 967.62 8619.18 0.00 9586.80
1992 1983 10778 967.62 8619.18 0.00 9586.80
1993 1983 10778 967.62 8619.18 0.00 9586.80
1994 1983 10778 967.62 8619.18 0.00 9586.80
1995 1983 10778 967.62 8619.18 0.00 9586.80
1996 1983 10778 967.62 8619.18 0.00 9586.80
1997 1983 10778 967.62 8619.18 0.00 9586.80
1998 1983 10778 967.62 8619.18 0.00 9586.80
1999 1983 10778 967.62 8619.18 0.00 9586.80
2000 1983 10778 967.62 8619.18 0.00 9586.80
2001 1983 10778 967.62 8619.18 0.00 9586.80
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 1653.48 11511.35 50.99 13215.83 11665
1992 1606.18 12113.65 50.99 13770.82 11665
1993 1603.19 12348.37 50.99 14002.56 11665
1994 1615.43 9276.92 50.99 10943.34 11665
1995 1627.07 9817.96 50.99 11496.02 11665
1996 1643.49 9545.84 50.99 11240.32 11665
1997 1643.04 9817.37 50.99 11511.40 11665
1998 1644.23 9918.07 50.99 11613.30 11665
1999 1644.08 9926.08 50.99 11621.15 11665
2000 1644.08 9926.08 50.99 11621.15 11665
2001 1651.54 10330.18 50.99 12032.72 11665
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 2892.17 0.00 454.02 454.02 3864.96 -972.79
1992 3494.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 3864.96 -370.49
1993 3729.19 0.00 79.02 79.02 3943.97 -214.78
1994 657.74 -2632.28 -317.81 -2950.09 993.89 -336.14
1995 1198.78 130.97 59.23 190.19 1184.08 14.70
1996 926.66 -26.19 0.00 -26.19 1157.88 -231.23
1997 1198.20 77.56 8.73 86.29 1244.18 -45.98
1998 1298.89 -20.66 -8.88 -29.54 1214.64 84.26
1999 1306.90 -1.89 -3.06 -4.95 1209.69 97.21
2000 1306.90 -1.89 -3.06 -4.95 1204.74 102.16
2001 1711.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1204.74 506.26
Current Data
Baseline Data
Quantity Variance Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 13.16 0.81 8501.41 8983.09 -920.62
1992 13.16 0.81 8501.41 8983.09 -350.62
1993 13.16 0.81 8501.41 8983.09 -203.26
1994 13.16 0.81 8501.41 8983.09 -318.12
1995 13.16 0.81 8501.41 8983.09 13.91
1996 13.16 0.81 8501.41 8983.09 -218.83
1997 13.16 0.81 8501.41 8983.09 -43.52
1998 13.16 0.81 8501.41 8983.09 79.74
1999 13.16 0.81 8501.41 8983.09 92.00
2000 13.16 0.81 8501.41 8983.09 96.68
2001 13.16 0.81 8501.41 8983.09 479.11
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 1.71 1.34 0.89 #DIV/0! 1.38 0.98
1992 1.66 1.41 0.96 #DIV/0! 1.44 1.04
1993 1.66 1.43 0.98 #DIV/0! 1.46 1.05
1994 1.67 1.08 0.96 #DIV/0! 1.14 1.04
1995 1.68 1.14 1.00 #DIV/0! 1.20 1.08
1996 1.70 1.11 0.97 #DIV/0! 1.17 1.05
1997 1.70 1.14 0.99 #DIV/0! 1.20 1.07
1998 1.70 1.15 1.01 #DIV/0! 1.21 1.08
1999 1.70 1.15 1.01 #DIV/0! 1.21 1.09
2000 1.70 1.15 1.01 #DIV/0! 1.21 1.09
2001 1.71 1.20 1.06 #DIV/0! 1.26 1.13
Learning Curve Analysis
Cost Growth Factors
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Appendix T.  SADARM 155mm Projectile ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1988 10156 300.35 304.89 0.00 605.25
1992 1988 10156 300.35 304.89 0.00 605.25
1993 1988 10156 300.35 304.89 0.00 605.25
1994 1988 10156 300.35 304.89 0.00 605.25
1995 1988 10156 300.35 304.89 0.00 605.25
1996 1988 10156 300.35 304.89 0.00 605.25
1997 1988 10156 300.35 304.89 0.00 605.25
1998 1988 10156 300.35 304.89 0.00 605.25
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 286.83 817.06 0.00 1103.90 39018
1992 295.93 837.47 0.00 1133.40 39018
1993 392.34 732.97 0.00 1125.32 39018
1994 401.06 1820.26 0.00 2221.32 73532
1995 462.09 1835.75 0.00 2297.84 73612
1996 461.33 1878.78 0.00 2340.11 73612
1997 450.09 1660.56 0.00 2110.65 50000
1998 477.00 1783.38 0.00 2260.38 50000
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 512.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 431.77 80.40
1992 532.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 431.77 100.81
1993 428.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 431.77 -3.69
1994 1515.37 408.04 40.82 448.86 880.63 634.74
1995 1530.86 0.74 0.49 1.23 881.86 649.00
1996 1573.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 881.86 692.03
1997 1355.67 -272.93 -157.24 -430.17 451.69 903.98
1998 1478.49 0.37 0.00 0.37 452.06 1026.43
Current Data
Baseline Data
Quantity Variance Data
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SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 0.55 0.91 1707.94 5520.76 24.87
1992 0.55 0.91 1707.94 5520.76 31.19
1993 0.55 0.91 1707.94 5520.76 -1.14
1994 0.55 0.91 1707.94 9591.59 113.03
1995 0.55 0.91 1707.94 9600.69 115.46
1996 0.55 0.91 1707.94 9600.69 123.11
1997 0.55 0.91 1707.94 6853.01 225.29
1998 0.55 0.91 1707.94 6853.01 255.81
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 0.95 2.68 1.08 #DIV/0! 1.82 1.02
1992 0.99 2.75 1.10 #DIV/0! 1.87 1.04
1993 1.31 2.40 1.00 #DIV/0! 1.86 1.15
1994 1.34 5.97 1.37 #DIV/0! 3.67 1.35
1995 1.54 6.02 1.38 #DIV/0! 3.80 1.46
1996 1.54 6.16 1.40 #DIV/0! 3.87 1.47
1997 1.50 5.45 1.74 #DIV/0! 3.49 1.62
1998 1.59 5.85 1.84 #DIV/0! 3.73 1.71
Cost Growth Factors
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix U.  SADARM 155mm Rocket ACGF Calculations 
(Data in CY 2000 Dollars in Millions) 
 
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII 
Baseline 
Qty
MSII 
Baseline 
RDTE $
MSII 
Baseline 
PROC $
MSII 
Baseline 
MCON $
MSII 
Baseline 
Total $
1991 1988 59110 749.87 865.01 0.00 1614.88
1992 1988 59110 778.30 865.01 0.00 1643.32
1993 1988 59110 828.99 865.01 0.00 1694.00
SAR 
YEAR
MSII 
Current 
RDTE $
MSII 
Current 
PROC $
MSII 
Current 
MCON $
MSII 
Current 
Total $
Current 
PROC Qty
1991 719.74 2156.87 0.00 2876.61 23712
1992 747.03 2312.76 0.00 3059.79 23712
1993 795.68 2137.20 0.00 2932.88 23712
SAR 
YEAR
Current 
PROC Var
Direct Qty 
Var
Indirect 
Qty Var
Total Qty 
Var
Cum Total 
Qty Var
Residual 
Var
1991 1291.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 1507.99 -216.13
1992 1447.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 1507.99 -60.24
1993 1272.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 1507.99 -235.80
SAR 
YEAR T1
Learn  
Curve
Theoretic 
Baseline 
Value
Theoretic 
Current 
Value
Calc Qty 
Var
1991 3.35 0.78 3489.54 1958.50 -385.09
1992 3.35 0.78 3489.54 1958.50 -107.33
1993 3.35 0.78 3489.54 1958.50 -420.13
SAR 
YEAR
RDTE 
CGF
UNADJ 
PROC 
CGF
ADJ 
PROC 
CGF
MCON 
CGF
UNADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
ADJ 
TOTAL 
CGF
1991 0.96 2.49 0.55 #DIV/0! 1.78 0.74
1992 0.96 2.67 0.88 #DIV/0! 1.86 0.92
1993 0.96 2.47 0.51 #DIV/0! 1.73 0.73
Cost Growth Factors
Quantity Variance Data
Current Data
Baseline Data
Learning Curve Analysis
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Appendix V.  Learning Curve Calculations 
(Data in program’s BY Dollars in Millions) 
 
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 200 103.40 0.52 5.30 -0.66 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 1100 213.50 0.19 7.00 -1.64 -0.57 2.39 10.86 0.67
3 3080 342.20 0.11 8.03 -2.20 -0.56 2.32 10.19 0.68
4 5680 499.20 0.09 8.64 -2.43 -0.54 2.16 8.70 0.69
5 8517 664.70 0.08 9.05 -2.55 -0.51 2.01 7.45 0.70
6 11741 803.70 0.07 9.37 -2.68 -0.50 1.91 6.74 0.71
7 15040 911.90 0.06 9.62 -2.80 -0.49 1.85 6.37 0.71
8 17580 1003.40 0.06 9.77 -2.86 -0.48 1.81 6.10 0.72
9 19659 1052.30 0.05 9.89 -2.93 -0.48 1.79 5.97 0.72
10 24914 1161.80 0.05 10.12 -3.07 -0.48 1.78 5.94 0.72
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 236 116.00 0.49 5.46 -0.71 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 456 205.20 0.45 6.12 -0.80 -0.13 0.02 1.02 0.91
3 690 278.70 0.40 6.54 -0.91 -0.18 0.27 1.31 0.88
4 930 344.60 0.37 6.84 -0.99 -0.20 0.42 1.53 0.87
5 1170 408.50 0.35 7.06 -1.05 -0.22 0.50 1.65 0.86
6 1410 491.40 0.35 7.25 -1.05 -0.21 0.46 1.58 0.86
7 1650 572.90 0.35 7.41 -1.06 -0.20 0.39 1.48 0.87
8 1873 649.90 0.35 7.54 -1.06 -0.19 0.32 1.37 0.88
9 2188 744.20 0.34 7.69 -1.08 -0.18 0.26 1.30 0.88
10 2542 838.20 0.33 7.84 -1.11 -0.17 0.23 1.26 0.89
11 2937 930.40 0.32 7.99 -1.15 -0.17 0.22 1.25 0.89
12 3033 968.60 0.32 8.02 -1.14 -0.17 0.20 1.23 0.89
13 3142 1011.30 0.32 8.05 -1.13 -0.17 0.18 1.20 0.89
14 3261 1059.20 0.32 8.09 -1.12 -0.16 0.16 1.17 0.89
15 3386 1117.80 0.33 8.13 -1.11 -0.16 0.13 1.13 0.90
16 3553 1191.60 0.34 8.18 -1.09 -0.15 0.09 1.09 0.90
AGM-65D (Maverick)
AGM-84A (Harpoon)
 
 110
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 80 74.90 0.94 4.38 -0.07 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 198 139.70 0.71 5.29 -0.35 -0.31 1.30 3.68 0.81
3 358 187.40 0.52 5.88 -0.65 -0.38 1.62 5.08 0.77
4 676 289.50 0.43 6.52 -0.85 -0.38 1.60 4.93 0.77
5 1489 434.40 0.29 7.31 -1.23 -0.40 1.72 5.56 0.76
6 2256 539.70 0.24 7.72 -1.43 -0.41 1.78 5.95 0.75
7 3250 656.80 0.20 8.09 -1.60 -0.42 1.83 6.22 0.75
8 4016 745.50 0.19 8.30 -1.68 -0.42 1.85 6.33 0.75
9 5323 876.00 0.16 8.58 -1.80 -0.43 1.86 6.41 0.74
10 6585 1005.60 0.15 8.79 -1.88 -0.43 1.86 6.41 0.74
11 8846 1223.20 0.14 9.09 -1.98 -0.42 1.85 6.33 0.75
12 9595 1321.40 0.14 9.17 -1.98 -0.42 1.83 6.20 0.75
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 680 60.40 0.09 6.52 -2.42 -0.50 0.84 2.32 0.71
2 4651 163.60 0.04 8.44 -3.35 -0.48 0.72 2.06 0.72
3 9302 251.70 0.03 9.14 -3.61 -0.46 0.57 1.77 0.73
4 15082 338.50 0.02 9.62 -3.80 -0.45 0.48 1.62 0.73
5 21082 412.10 0.02 9.96 -3.93 -0.44 0.43 1.54 0.74
6 21082 412.10 0.02 9.96 -3.93 -0.44 0.41 1.50 0.74
7 27082 480.80 0.02 10.21 -4.03 -0.43 0.38 1.46 0.74
8 33082 549.20 0.02 10.41 -4.10 -0.43 0.35 1.42 0.74
9 35386 574.90 0.02 10.47 -4.12 -0.43 0.32 1.38 0.74
10 41071 633.40 0.02 10.62 -4.17 -0.42 0.29 1.34 0.75
11 41166 637.00 0.02 10.63 -4.17 -0.42 0.27 1.31 0.75
12 43412 663.20 0.02 10.68 -4.18 -0.42 0.25 1.28 0.75
13 44829 682.50 0.02 10.71 -4.18 -0.42 0.23 1.26 0.75
14 45659 705.50 0.02 10.73 -4.17 -0.41 0.20 1.22 0.75
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 352 219.10 0.62 5.86 -0.47 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 1408 460.60 0.33 7.25 -1.12 -0.46 2.25 9.46 0.72
3 2508 682.60 0.27 7.83 -1.30 -0.43 2.03 7.62 0.74
4 4508 1007.10 0.22 8.41 -1.50 -0.40 1.87 6.51 0.76
5 6708 1279.50 0.19 8.81 -1.66 -0.40 1.82 6.16 0.76
6 8908 1537.70 0.17 9.09 -1.76 -0.39 1.78 5.92 0.76
7 11108 1747.50 0.16 9.32 -1.85 -0.39 1.77 5.84 0.76
8 12905 2030.50 0.16 9.47 -1.85 -0.38 1.71 5.53 0.77
AGM-88 (HARM USN)
AGM-114 (Hellfire)
AGM-114K (Hellfire Longbow)
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Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 130 52.30 0.40 4.87 -0.91 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 363 106.90 0.29 5.89 -1.22 -0.30 0.57 1.77 0.81
3 944 206.80 0.22 6.85 -1.52 -0.31 0.58 1.79 0.81
4 1430 300.30 0.21 7.27 -1.56 -0.28 0.44 1.56 0.82
5 1824 379.40 0.21 7.51 -1.57 -0.26 0.33 1.39 0.83
6 2226 459.90 0.21 7.71 -1.58 -0.24 0.23 1.26 0.84
7 2628 538.50 0.20 7.87 -1.59 -0.23 0.15 1.16 0.85
8 3387 672.10 0.20 8.13 -1.62 -0.22 0.08 1.08 0.86
9 4144 815.00 0.20 8.33 -1.63 -0.21 0.00 1.00 0.87
10 4912 952.70 0.19 8.50 -1.64 -0.19 -0.06 0.94 0.87
11 5680 1085.90 0.19 8.64 -1.65 -0.19 -0.12 0.89 0.88
12 6391 1210.50 0.19 8.76 -1.66 -0.18 -0.16 0.85 0.88
13 7036 1330.80 0.19 8.86 -1.67 -0.17 -0.20 0.82 0.89
14 7681 1448.50 0.19 8.95 -1.67 -0.17 -0.24 0.79 0.89
15 8326 1563.70 0.19 9.03 -1.67 -0.16 -0.27 0.76 0.89
16 8971 1677.80 0.19 9.10 -1.68 -0.16 -0.30 0.74 0.90
17 9593 1789.30 0.19 9.17 -1.68 -0.15 -0.33 0.72 0.90
18 10087 1876.90 0.19 9.22 -1.68 -0.15 -0.35 0.70 0.90
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 60 77.50 1.29 4.09 0.26 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 120 155.00 1.29 4.79 0.26 0.00 0.26 1.29 1.00
3 192 239.30 1.25 5.26 0.22 -0.03 0.38 1.46 0.98
4 300 352.50 1.18 5.70 0.16 -0.06 0.51 1.66 0.96
5 565 497.10 0.88 6.34 -0.13 -0.16 0.99 2.68 0.90
6 830 660.60 0.80 6.72 -0.23 -0.20 1.17 3.22 0.87
7 1095 794.30 0.73 7.00 -0.32 -0.22 1.28 3.58 0.86
8 1300 915.30 0.70 7.17 -0.35 -0.23 1.32 3.75 0.85
9 1660 1061.10 0.64 7.41 -0.45 -0.24 1.38 3.96 0.85
10 2063 1221.70 0.59 7.63 -0.52 -0.25 1.42 4.16 0.84
11 2483 1351.90 0.54 7.82 -0.61 -0.26 1.48 4.38 0.84
AIM-54C (Phoenix)
AIM-9X (Sidewinder)
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Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 180 1006.40 5.59 5.19 1.72 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 580 1760.30 3.04 6.36 1.11 -0.52 4.43 84.16 0.70
3 1480 2589.90 1.75 7.30 0.56 -0.55 4.59 98.32 0.68
4 2368 3355.00 1.42 7.77 0.35 -0.54 4.53 92.80 0.69
5 3268 4201.00 1.29 8.09 0.25 -0.52 4.42 82.81 0.70
6 4159 4893.20 1.18 8.33 0.16 -0.51 4.33 75.81 0.70
7 5324 5548.30 1.04 8.58 0.04 -0.50 4.28 71.92 0.71
8 6382 6011.50 0.94 8.76 -0.06 -0.49 4.25 70.25 0.71
9 6900 6289.80 0.91 8.84 -0.09 -0.49 4.23 68.98 0.71
10 7306 6517.70 0.89 8.90 -0.11 -0.49 4.22 67.91 0.71
11 7539 6664.40 0.88 8.93 -0.12 -0.49 4.20 66.97 0.71
12 7832 6802.80 0.87 8.97 -0.14 -0.49 4.19 66.25 0.71
13 8112 6925.60 0.85 9.00 -0.16 -0.48 4.19 65.70 0.71
14 8366 7036.50 0.84 9.03 -0.17 -0.48 4.18 65.26 0.72
15 8599 7148.80 0.83 9.06 -0.18 -0.48 4.17 64.87 0.72
16 8846 7265.80 0.82 9.09 -0.20 -0.48 4.17 64.51 0.72
17 9107 7381.00 0.81 9.12 -0.21 -0.48 4.16 64.19 0.72
18 9374 7498.00 0.80 9.15 -0.22 -0.48 4.16 63.91 0.72
19 9638 7614.00 0.79 9.17 -0.24 -0.48 4.15 63.65 0.72
20 9900 7726.00 0.78 9.20 -0.25 -0.48 4.15 63.40 0.72
21 10161 7834.00 0.77 9.23 -0.26 -0.48 4.15 63.18 0.72
22 10917 8075.50 0.74 9.30 -0.30 -0.48 4.14 63.08 0.72
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 304 88.80 0.29 5.72 -1.23 -0.25 0.20 1.22 0.84
2 913 204.60 0.22 6.82 -1.50 -0.24 0.15 1.16 0.85
3 1418 302.50 0.21 7.26 -1.54 -0.21 -0.03 0.97 0.86
4 1501 326.40 0.22 7.31 -1.53 -0.20 -0.13 0.88 0.87
5 1501 346.10 0.23 7.31 -1.47 -0.18 -0.25 0.78 0.89
6 1803 450.80 0.25 7.50 -1.39 -0.13 -0.50 0.60 0.91
7 2272 564.60 0.25 7.73 -1.39 -0.10 -0.73 0.48 0.93
8 3217 696.50 0.22 8.08 -1.53 -0.10 -0.74 0.48 0.93
9 4269 828.40 0.19 8.36 -1.64 -0.12 -0.62 0.54 0.92
10 6117 1018.80 0.17 8.72 -1.79 -0.15 -0.39 0.67 0.90
11 8171 1217.90 0.15 9.01 -1.90 -0.18 -0.19 0.83 0.88
12 10226 1405.90 0.14 9.23 -1.98 -0.20 -0.03 0.97 0.87
13 12189 1579.10 0.13 9.41 -2.04 -0.21 0.08 1.09 0.86
14 14139 1739.50 0.12 9.56 -2.10 -0.23 0.17 1.19 0.85
15 16089 1901.10 0.12 9.69 -2.14 -0.24 0.24 1.27 0.85
AIM-120 (AMRAAM)
ATACMS P3I (BAT)
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Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 100 75.30 0.75 4.61 -0.28 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 280 154.80 0.55 5.63 -0.59 -0.30 1.10 3.00 0.81
3 694 277.80 0.40 6.54 -0.92 -0.33 1.22 3.40 0.80
4 1222 390.00 0.32 7.11 -1.14 -0.34 1.31 3.70 0.79
5 1251 537.30 0.43 7.13 -0.85 -0.29 1.02 2.76 0.82
6 1286 559.20 0.43 7.16 -0.83 -0.26 0.87 2.38 0.84
7 1687 681.10 0.40 7.43 -0.91 -0.24 0.76 2.14 0.85
8 2444 887.90 0.36 7.80 -1.01 -0.23 0.69 2.00 0.86
9 3448 1150.60 0.33 8.15 -1.10 -0.22 0.65 1.92 0.86
10 4347 1397.00 0.32 8.38 -1.14 -0.21 0.62 1.85 0.86
11 5120 1622.70 0.32 8.54 -1.15 -0.21 0.58 1.79 0.87
12 6649 1938.80 0.29 8.80 -1.23 -0.21 0.57 1.77 0.87
13 8074 2241.20 0.28 9.00 -1.28 -0.21 0.57 1.77 0.87
14 9319 2504.60 0.27 9.14 -1.31 -0.21 0.57 1.77 0.87
15 10546 2724.80 0.26 9.26 -1.35 -0.21 0.58 1.78 0.87
16 11540 2853.40 0.25 9.35 -1.40 -0.21 0.59 1.81 0.87
17 12590 3004.50 0.24 9.44 -1.43 -0.21 0.61 1.84 0.86
18 13640 3170.20 0.23 9.52 -1.46 -0.21 0.62 1.87 0.86
19 14690 3333.60 0.23 9.59 -1.48 -0.22 0.64 1.90 0.86
20 15740 3497.30 0.22 9.66 -1.50 -0.22 0.66 1.93 0.86
21 16114 3567.70 0.22 9.69 -1.51 -0.22 0.67 1.95 0.86
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 75 154.80 2.06 4.32 0.72 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 175 277.80 1.59 5.16 0.46 -0.31 2.06 7.86 0.81
3 325 390.00 1.20 5.78 0.18 -0.37 2.32 10.18 0.78
4 575 537.30 0.93 6.35 -0.07 -0.39 2.44 11.49 0.76
5 825 559.20 0.68 6.72 -0.39 -0.45 2.73 15.30 0.73
6 1075 681.10 0.63 6.98 -0.46 -0.46 2.78 16.15 0.73
7 1325 887.90 0.67 7.19 -0.40 -0.44 2.67 14.47 0.74
8 1575 1150.60 0.73 7.36 -0.31 -0.40 2.49 12.04 0.76
9 2035 1397.00 0.69 7.62 -0.38 -0.38 2.34 10.35 0.77
10 2550 1622.70 0.64 7.84 -0.45 -0.36 2.23 9.31 0.78
11 3000 1938.80 0.65 8.01 -0.44 -0.34 2.12 8.31 0.79
12 4425 2241.20 0.51 8.40 -0.68 -0.33 2.09 8.11 0.79
13 5670 2504.60 0.44 8.64 -0.82 -0.34 2.10 8.20 0.79
14 6897 2724.80 0.40 8.84 -0.93 -0.34 2.13 8.44 0.79
15 7891 2853.40 0.36 8.97 -1.02 -0.35 2.17 8.78 0.79
16 8941 3004.50 0.34 9.10 -1.09 -0.35 2.21 9.13 0.78
17 9991 3170.20 0.32 9.21 -1.15 -0.36 2.25 9.47 0.78
18 11041 3333.60 0.30 9.31 -1.20 -0.36 2.28 9.78 0.78
19 12091 3497.30 0.29 9.40 -1.24 -0.37 2.31 10.06 0.77
20 12465 3567.70 0.29 9.43 -1.25 -0.37 2.33 10.28 0.77
BLU-108 JSOW Unitary
BLU-108 JSOW AIWS
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Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 98 56.60 0.58 4.58 -0.55 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 120 65.30 0.54 4.79 -0.61 -0.29 0.80 2.22 0.82
3 251 112.00 0.45 5.53 -0.81 -0.27 0.70 2.01 0.83
4 524 159.80 0.30 6.26 -1.19 -0.37 1.18 3.26 0.77
5 1045 229.70 0.22 6.95 -1.51 -0.41 1.36 3.91 0.75
6 1587 293.70 0.19 7.37 -1.69 -0.42 1.41 4.10 0.75
7 2137 356.70 0.17 7.67 -1.79 -0.42 1.41 4.09 0.75
8 2534 409.00 0.16 7.84 -1.82 -0.41 1.38 3.99 0.75
9 2737 434.20 0.16 7.91 -1.84 -0.41 1.36 3.90 0.75
10 3037 475.20 0.16 8.02 -1.85 -0.40 1.33 3.79 0.76
11 3337 509.90 0.15 8.11 -1.88 -0.40 1.31 3.70 0.76
12 3637 543.90 0.15 8.20 -1.90 -0.39 1.28 3.61 0.76
13 3937 576.90 0.15 8.28 -1.92 -0.39 1.26 3.54 0.76
14 4237 608.40 0.14 8.35 -1.94 -0.39 1.24 3.47 0.76
15 4537 644.40 0.14 8.42 -1.95 -0.38 1.22 3.40 0.77
16 4837 681.60 0.14 8.48 -1.96 -0.38 1.20 3.33 0.77
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 703 65.30 0.09 6.56 -2.38 0.00 -2.38 0.09 1.00
2 1575 112.00 0.07 7.36 -2.64 -0.33 -0.21 0.81 0.79
3 2585 159.80 0.06 7.86 -2.78 -0.31 -0.32 0.73 0.80
4 3746 229.70 0.06 8.23 -2.79 -0.26 -0.69 0.50 0.83
5 5020 293.70 0.06 8.52 -2.84 -0.24 -0.87 0.42 0.85
6 9330 356.70 0.04 9.14 -3.26 -0.30 -0.36 0.70 0.81
7 12708 409.00 0.03 9.45 -3.44 -0.35 -0.05 0.95 0.79
8 15789 434.20 0.03 9.67 -3.59 -0.38 0.19 1.21 0.77
9 19928 475.20 0.02 9.90 -3.74 -0.40 0.38 1.46 0.76
10 21653 509.90 0.02 9.98 -3.75 -0.41 0.47 1.60 0.75
11 23021 543.90 0.02 10.04 -3.75 -0.42 0.51 1.66 0.75
12 24472 576.90 0.02 10.11 -3.75 -0.42 0.52 1.68 0.75
13 24472 608.40 0.02 10.11 -3.69 -0.42 0.50 1.65 0.75
14 25794 681.60 0.03 10.16 -3.63 -0.41 0.45 1.56 0.75
CBU-97B SFW
FGM-148A Javeline AAWS
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Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 937 21.80 0.02 6.84 -3.76 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 3312 78.20 0.02 8.11 -3.75 0.01 -3.84 0.02 1.01
3 7835 184.70 0.02 8.97 -3.75 0.01 -3.80 0.02 1.00
4 17476 389.30 0.02 9.77 -3.80 -0.01 -3.66 0.03 0.99
5 28705 631.80 0.02 10.26 -3.82 -0.02 -3.62 0.03 0.99
6 38792 830.20 0.02 10.57 -3.84 -0.02 -3.57 0.03 0.98
7 66589 1344.00 0.02 11.11 -3.90 -0.03 -3.50 0.03 0.98
8 85086 1687.20 0.02 11.35 -3.92 -0.04 -3.46 0.03 0.97
9 103731 2050.60 0.02 11.55 -3.92 -0.04 -3.43 0.03 0.97
10 123045 2430.90 0.02 11.72 -3.92 -0.04 -3.42 0.03 0.97
11 135971 2696.70 0.02 11.82 -3.92 -0.04 -3.42 0.03 0.97
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 117 241.50 2.06 4.76 0.72 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 247 456.40 1.85 5.51 0.61 -0.15 1.43 4.18 0.90
3 423 740.50 1.75 6.05 0.56 -0.13 1.34 3.81 0.91
4 710 1042.10 1.47 6.57 0.38 -0.18 1.59 4.91 0.88
5 1150 1357.00 1.18 7.05 0.17 -0.23 1.89 6.64 0.85
6 1590 1683.30 1.06 7.37 0.06 -0.26 2.04 7.66 0.83
7 2150 1975.80 0.92 7.67 -0.08 -0.28 2.17 8.74 0.82
8 2850 2262.20 0.79 7.96 -0.23 -0.31 2.30 9.94 0.81
9 3565 2526.80 0.71 8.18 -0.34 -0.32 2.40 11.06 0.80
10 4380 2762.30 0.63 8.38 -0.46 -0.34 2.50 12.21 0.79
11 5340 2942.60 0.55 8.58 -0.60 -0.36 2.61 13.56 0.78
12 6475 3135.90 0.48 8.78 -0.73 -0.37 2.71 15.06 0.77
13 6915 3191.90 0.46 8.84 -0.77 -0.39 2.79 16.33 0.76
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 6 616.50 102.75 1.79 4.63 4.00 -2.53 0.08 16.00
2 12 845.90 70.49 2.48 4.26 -0.54 5.61 272.14 0.69
3 18 1035.80 57.54 2.89 4.05 -0.53 5.58 264.60 0.69
4 44 1285.20 29.21 3.78 3.37 -0.63 5.80 331.77 0.65
5 50 1443.70 28.87 3.91 3.36 -0.62 5.79 326.33 0.65
6 88 1760.00 20.00 4.48 3.00 -0.62 5.79 326.79 0.65
7 132 2038.90 15.45 4.88 2.74 -0.62 5.79 327.92 0.65
8 204 2581.90 12.66 5.32 2.54 -0.61 5.76 317.90 0.65
9 276 3010.00 10.91 5.62 2.39 -0.60 5.73 308.52 0.66
10 348 3467.30 9.96 5.85 2.30 -0.59 5.70 298.51 0.66
11 479 3849.60 8.04 6.17 2.08 -0.59 5.68 294.22 0.66
12 623 4211.10 6.76 6.43 1.91 -0.59 5.68 292.79 0.67
13 767 4573.20 5.96 6.64 1.79 -0.59 5.68 292.04 0.67
14 911 4889.50 5.37 6.81 1.68 -0.59 5.68 291.76 0.67
15 1055 5195.90 4.93 6.96 1.59 -0.59 5.68 291.55 0.67
16 1199 5640.40 4.70 7.09 1.55 -0.59 5.67 289.90 0.67
MIM-104 Patriot
MIM-104 Patriot PAC3
JDAM
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Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 11 219.20 19.93 2.40 2.99 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 22 282.30 12.83 3.09 2.55 -0.64 4.51 91.36 0.64
3 50 386.90 7.74 3.91 2.05 -0.62 4.49 88.85 0.65
4 108 595.20 5.51 4.68 1.71 -0.57 4.32 75.45 0.67
5 228 919.60 4.03 5.43 1.39 -0.53 4.20 66.53 0.69
6 386 1300.30 3.37 5.96 1.21 -0.50 4.10 60.37 0.71
7 595 1752.70 2.95 6.39 1.08 -0.48 4.02 55.73 0.72
8 822 2212.90 2.69 6.71 0.99 -0.46 3.96 52.22 0.73
9 1052 2682.80 2.55 6.96 0.94 -0.44 3.90 49.34 0.74
10 1293 3108.50 2.40 7.16 0.88 -0.43 3.85 47.18 0.74
11 1500 3483.90 2.32 7.31 0.84 -0.42 3.82 45.45 0.75
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 6 22.50 3.75 1.79 1.32 1.00 -0.47 0.63 2.00
2 56 122.60 2.19 4.03 0.78 -0.24 1.75 5.77 0.85
3 117 241.60 2.06 4.76 0.73 -0.21 1.68 5.39 0.86
4 168 352.80 2.10 5.12 0.74 -0.19 1.62 5.07 0.88
5 292 520.40 1.78 5.68 0.58 -0.18 1.62 5.05 0.88
6 472 786.60 1.67 6.16 0.51 -0.18 1.61 4.99 0.88
7 721 1102.50 1.53 6.58 0.42 -0.18 1.60 4.97 0.88
8 1045 1426.20 1.36 6.95 0.31 -0.18 1.62 5.05 0.88
9 1520 1787.20 1.18 7.33 0.16 -0.19 1.66 5.24 0.87
10 2030 2068.00 1.02 7.62 0.02 -0.20 1.71 5.51 0.87
11 2430 2305.90 0.95 7.80 -0.05 -0.21 1.75 5.75 0.86
12 3108 2720.30 0.88 8.04 -0.13 -0.22 1.79 5.97 0.86
13 3284 2881.80 0.88 8.10 -0.13 -0.23 1.81 6.11 0.85
14 3484 3039.20 0.87 8.16 -0.14 -0.23 1.83 6.21 0.85
15 3700 3128.60 0.85 8.22 -0.17 -0.24 1.84 6.30 0.85
16 3974 3223.70 0.81 8.29 -0.21 -0.24 1.86 6.40 0.85
17 4081 3264.60 0.80 8.31 -0.22 -0.24 1.87 6.49 0.85
18 4201 3302.30 0.79 8.34 -0.24 -0.24 1.88 6.58 0.84
19 4301 3335.30 0.78 8.37 -0.25 -0.25 1.90 6.65 0.84
Navy Area TBMD
RGM-109 Tomahawk MMM
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Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 22 92.40 4.20 3.09 1.44 0.50 -0.11 0.90 1.41
2 58 166.30 2.87 4.06 1.05 -0.39 2.65 14.19 0.76
3 98 240.50 2.45 4.58 0.90 -0.36 2.55 12.84 0.78
4 138 306.60 2.22 4.93 0.80 -0.35 2.50 12.16 0.79
5 223 388.70 1.74 5.41 0.56 -0.37 2.57 13.02 0.78
6 568 586.90 1.03 6.34 0.03 -0.42 2.79 16.21 0.75
7 1063 874.10 0.82 6.97 -0.20 -0.43 2.83 16.88 0.74
8 1563 1273.60 0.81 7.35 -0.20 -0.41 2.75 15.65 0.75
9 2053 1659.10 0.81 7.63 -0.21 -0.39 2.67 14.38 0.76
10 2783 2102.60 0.76 7.93 -0.28 -0.38 2.60 13.40 0.77
11 4054 2762.50 0.68 8.31 -0.38 -0.37 2.54 12.62 0.78
12 5248 3345.70 0.64 8.57 -0.45 -0.36 2.49 12.03 0.78
13 6558 3818.40 0.58 8.79 -0.54 -0.35 2.46 11.68 0.78
14 7868 4293.10 0.55 8.97 -0.61 -0.35 2.44 11.44 0.79
15 8578 4597.60 0.54 9.06 -0.62 -0.34 2.42 11.24 0.79
16 8983 4826.00 0.54 9.10 -0.62 -0.34 2.40 11.05 0.79
17 9313 5020.40 0.54 9.14 -0.62 -0.34 2.39 10.88 0.79
18 9643 5200.70 0.54 9.17 -0.62 -0.33 2.37 10.73 0.79
19 9845 5358.20 0.54 9.19 -0.61 -0.33 2.36 10.59 0.79
20 10033 5525.80 0.55 9.21 -0.60 -0.33 2.35 10.44 0.80
21 10055 5617.40 0.56 9.22 -0.58 -0.33 2.33 10.31 0.80
22 10182 5763.70 0.57 9.23 -0.57 -0.32 2.32 10.18 0.80
23 10270 5882.80 0.57 9.24 -0.56 -0.32 2.31 10.05 0.80
24 10384 6005.30 0.58 9.25 -0.55 -0.32 2.29 9.92 0.80
25 10459 6074.00 0.58 9.26 -0.54 -0.32 2.28 9.81 0.80
26 10534 6145.30 0.58 9.26 -0.54 -0.32 2.27 9.71 0.80
27 10630 6251.70 0.59 9.27 -0.53 -0.31 2.26 9.61 0.80
28 10723 6356.30 0.59 9.28 -0.52 -0.31 2.25 9.51 0.81
29 10862 6485.60 0.60 9.29 -0.52 -0.31 2.24 9.42 0.81
30 11001 6612.50 0.60 9.31 -0.51 -0.31 2.23 9.32 0.81
31 11210 6789.90 0.61 9.32 -0.50 -0.31 2.22 9.23 0.81
32 11446 6964.90 0.61 9.35 -0.50 -0.30 2.21 9.14 0.81
33 11665 7098.90 0.61 9.36 -0.50 -0.30 2.20 9.05 0.81
RIM-66M/67D (SM-2 MR/ER)
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Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 110 24.50 0.22 4.70 -1.50 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 233 60.90 0.26 5.45 -1.34 0.21 -2.50 0.08 1.16
3 833 135.70 0.16 6.73 -1.81 -0.18 -0.55 0.57 0.88
4 1033 187.40 0.18 6.94 -1.71 -0.15 -0.67 0.51 0.90
5 1063 212.00 0.20 6.97 -1.61 -0.13 -0.81 0.45 0.91
Lot 
Number
Cum Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
ln 
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 246 84.80 0.34 5.51 -1.07 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 594 164.70 0.28 6.39 -1.28 -0.25 0.29 1.34 0.84
3 1086 255.30 0.24 6.99 -1.45 -0.26 0.35 1.42 0.84
4 2886 395.70 0.14 7.97 -1.99 -0.37 1.04 2.84 0.77
5 4986 545.30 0.11 8.51 -2.21 -0.40 1.20 3.31 0.76
6 7326 704.40 0.10 8.90 -2.34 -0.40 1.22 3.39 0.76
7 9786 866.10 0.09 9.19 -2.42 -0.40 1.20 3.33 0.76
8 13086 1073.30 0.08 9.48 -2.50 -0.39 1.16 3.20 0.76
9 17112 1317.00 0.08 9.75 -2.56 -0.38 1.11 3.04 0.77
10 21018 1550.50 0.07 9.95 -2.61 -0.38 1.06 2.88 0.77
11 23712 1738.40 0.07 10.07 -2.61 -0.37 1.00 2.73 0.78
SADARM 155mm Projectile
SADARM 155mm Rocket
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